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A STATUTORY NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENT 
Amy L. Stein* 
Abstract 
Not all presidential power to address national security threats stems 
from the Constitution. Some presidential national security powers stem 
from statute, creating complicated questions about the limits of these 
powers delegated to the President by Congress. Scholars who have 
explored ways to achieve the proper balance between responsiveness and 
accountability have generally focused on the proper degree of deference 
that courts should provide to the President interpreting statutory 
provisions, with little confidence in the utility and efficacy of statutory 
constraints.  
This Article counters this narrative by arguing that a key to achieving 
this balance may lie in such constraints. Instead of defaulting to the broad 
deference often provided when the President is exercising constitutional 
national security powers, this Article urges both courts and Congress to 
be more attentive to the differences between constitutional and statutory 
national security powers and realize that statutory national security 
authorities are more amenable to constraints.  
Specifically, this Article focuses on procedural constraints as viable, 
yet underappreciated, mechanisms to enhance transparency and 
consistency. It is also the first to argue for a distinction between acute 
and chronic national security threats and to propose a sliding scale of 
procedural constraints that is tailored to each threat classification. It 
argues that such constraints pose minimal separation of powers concerns 
where the President is already acting under delegated statutory power, 
encouraging more thoughtful analyses without hindering the ability of 
the President to respond nimbly to national security threats.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The linchpin of our Republic, the separation of powers, is being tested 
like never before, particularly with respect to national security matters. 
Although courts and scholars have long debated the proper balance of 
national security powers among the branches, much of this analysis 
focuses on a president’s constitutional war powers to perform acts related 
to national security. But not all of a president’s national security powers 
come from the Constitution. Some of a president’s national security 
authority stems from statutes, delegated by Congress. Professor Kevin 
Stack has spent the last decade expertly exploring the nuances of a 
“statutory President,” focusing on complicated and necessary questions 
of deference, reviewability, and contingent delegations.1 This Article 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1013–
14 (2007) [hereinafter Stack, Constitutional Foundations]; Kevin M. Stack, The President’s 
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 304–10 (2006) [hereinafter 
Stack, Statutory Powers]; Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172–73 (2009) [hereinafter Stack, Reviewability]; Kevin M. Stack, The 
Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553 (2005) [hereinafter, Stack, Statutory President] 
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builds on his comprehensive work, focusing explicitly on the additional 
wrinkles in the analysis when the statutory President is exercising 
statutory national security powers, a president that I have termed the 
“Statutory National Security President.” 
Despite over 2,100 references in the United States Code to national 
security,2 the term is rarely defined, creating complicated questions at the 
intersection of constitutional and administrative law. Can a president 
unilaterally declare that national security is threatened without any 
demonstration of the threat? How is a court to review a president’s 
interpretation of these statutory terms? What is the proper analysis for 
courts in reviewing these exertions of statutory power? These challenges 
are exacerbated by the changing nature of national security threats. 
Whereas Congress may have envisioned wars when such national 
security provisions were enacted, national security threats now include 
terrorist attacks,3 electric grid emergencies,4 climate change,5 and even 
global competition.6 The statutory powers provided to the President to 
address such national security threats are varied, extensive, and 
underexplored in the legal literature. 
This Article has three main objectives. First, it provides evidence of 
the extensiveness of presidential national security authority that stems 
from statute. These delegations are broad and largely without limitations, 
rendering presidents capable of expansive interpretations cloaked in 
statutory authority. Second, this Article demonstrates the shortcomings 
of judicial review as applied to presidential assertions of statutory 
national security. Faced with such broad grants of authority, many look 
to the Judicial Branch to provide a necessary check on this unbridled 
power. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to provide clear 
instruction on the proper level of deference to provide a president, as 
opposed to an agency, interpreting statutory provisions. Third, to address 
the limitations of the current muddled deference doctrine, this Article sets 
                                                                                                                     
(“The only potential constitutional source of procedural constraint on presidential orders is the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”). 
 2. See infra note 37. 
 3. Press Release, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Executive Order 13224 (Sept. 23, 2001), https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5KCB-X3Q7]. 
 4. DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority, OFFICE ELEC.: U.S. DEP’T 
ENERGY, https://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/ 
other-regulatory-efforts/does-use [https://perma.cc/KWT3-A7X6]. 
 5. Associated Press, Congress Declares Climate Change a National Security Threat, N.Y. 
POST (July 14, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/07/14/congress-declares-climate-
change-a-national-security-threat/ [https://perma.cc/R3P4-6UKW]. 
 6. Mattis: US National Security Focus No Longer Terrorism, BBC (Jan. 19, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42752298 [https://perma.cc/G2YV-DKVK]. 
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forth an alternative mechanism to provide a more effective check on a 
Statutory National Security President. Specifically, it urges Congress to 
provide explicit procedural constraints that a president must pursue prior 
to unlocking these statutory national security powers. 
This Article identifies the perpetual problem that results from failing 
to clearly distinguish presidential actions that are grounded in statutory 
powers from those grounded in constitutional powers. Regardless of the 
source of the President’s national security authority, the discussions 
generally revolve around the amount of deference given to the President 
on national security issues.7 Where constitutional powers are used, 
however, the courts often revert to grand statements and entrenched 
doctrine about the deference to the political branches on national 
security.8 Where statutory powers are used, the courts apply an ad hoc 
process to determine how much deference to afford the President.9 Where 
presidents rely on both constitutional and statutory powers, the situation 
is even more muddled.10 
The scope of these analyses therefore ends up somewhat distorted. 
Whereas constitutional national security powers are exceptionally broad, 
(enough so that scholars have even coined a term, “national security 
exceptionalism”11) statutory national security powers are more 
constrained. These powers are delegated by Congress, and are therefore 
subject to more discrete and explicit limits than the President’s 
constitutional powers. National security powers that are delegated by 
Congress are also powers that originate from a political branch.12 This 
negates some of the traditional arguments that constrain the Judiciary 
when reviewing the Executive, many of which argue that a political 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See infra Section II.B. As Robert Schapiro has defined it, “deference involves a 
decisionmaker following a determination made by some other individual or institution that it 
might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently.” Paul Horwitz, 
Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2008) (citing Robert A. Schapiro, 
Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000)). 
 8. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 9. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign 
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 786 (2011) (“If there is no predictable or sensible way of 
determining how much attention the Court will pay executive views in construing foreign relations 
law, rule-of-law interests require, at a minimum, the development of a new understanding of the 
judicial relationship to the executive on questions of law interpretation.”); see infra notes 184–
217 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 311–33 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
225, 226. 
 12. The concept of delegated authority from Congress may be difficult for some formalists, 
see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001), but delegations to a president 
may be less controversial than delegations to an agency. 
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branch needs to make national security decisions.13 In cases where 
Congress has delegated national security power to a president, the court 
may very well be pitted between two political branches: one that 
delegated the authority and established parameters and one that is 
interpreting and executing that authority. This important distinction may 
change the dynamics between the branches, the willingness to tread into 
areas traditionally thought to be sacrosanct, and the court’s ability to 
engage in a more searching review of the President’s actions. As Justice 
Andrew Jackson remarked, “[p]residential powers are not fixed but 
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.”14  
Part I of this Article highlights the unique challenges of a Statutory 
National Security President—one whose powers stem not from the 
Constitution, but from a specific statutory provision. It then provides 
some examples of the broad range of statutory national security powers 
without discernible limits, demonstrating the difficulties associated with 
judicial review. This Part provides a sampling of the types of broad 
authority that Congress has delegated to the President on national security 
matters and notes the ambiguity and definitional uncertainty surrounding 
national security terms. 
Part II then tackles the deference dilemma. The historical 
jurisprudence on this issue has resulted in a muddled legal landscape that 
leaves open many questions regarding the review of a president’s 
interpretation of a statutory national security provision. This Part first 
explores the jurisprudence at the intersection of constitutional, 
administrative, and national security law. It then provides some critical 
background on a few of the complications of a statutory President, 
particularly the compounded deference that a president receives when 
acting under express statutory authority and in the name of national 
security. Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court has found that the 
President is not considered an agency governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).15 The Court declined to apply the traditional 
Chevron16 deference provided to an agency’s interpretation of a statute to 
a president’s interpretation of a statute and neglected to provide an 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See infra note 105.  
 14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 15. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 16. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court in Chevron established a two-part test for 
review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. at 842–43. At Step One, the court asks 
whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue. Id. If not, the analysis 
proceeds to Step Two, where the court merely asks whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. 
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alternative standard of review.17 This leaves a critical void in the 
jurisprudence where encountering a Statutory National Security 
President, allowing inconsistencies to develop in the doctrine. For this 
reason and others, this Part examines the shortcomings of judicial review 
of this type of president.  
Most scholars have sought clarification by engaging in a debate about 
the appropriate degree of deference that courts should provide to a 
president interpreting a statutory national security provision.18 Although 
deference is an essential component of untangling these issues, resorting 
to deference arguments is not enough. These deference discussions fail to 
ask critical questions about how procedural constraints could be more 
effective and how Congress could remain within their constitutional 
powers in limiting a president’s statutory powers. This Part will 
demonstrate why relying on deference alone is unsatisfying on a number 
of levels. 
Given the limitations on deference, Part III of this Article proposes an 
alternative approach for achieving an improved balance between the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches. It argues against Congress 
reflexively assuming that delegations of national security power should 
be committed to the President’s discretion. Instead, with each statutory 
grant of national security power, it urges Congress to consider whether 
imposing substantive and procedural constraints may be appropriate and 
desirable in a broader set of circumstances than currently exists. It argues 
that Congress should consider systematically the question of constraints 
on delegations of statutory national security powers. To demonstrate the 
viability of such a proposal, this Article first identifies a number of 
existing procedural constraints that Congress has placed on a Statutory 
National Security President, sorting them into categories based on their 
degree of burden. It argues that it is time for a new approach that focuses 
not only on the appropriate degree of deference, but also on the right level 
of external constraint. It pays particular attention to procedural 
constraints—those that impose some sort of demonstration, hearing, 
reporting, or consultation—before a president acts on her statutory 
national security power. Although a number of scholars dismiss these 
procedural constraints as having questionable utility,19 this Article 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 18. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 9. 
 19. Although some articles have made oblique mention of statutory or procedural 
constraints on presidential authority, few have actually explored the viability of such constraints. 
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 693 (2008) 
(arguing that academic attention should shift to the question “of whether and when the President 
may exercise Article II war powers in contravention of congressional limitations”); Brian M. 
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counters that narrative with concrete examples of procedural constraints 
that Congress has imposed on the President prior to exercising statutory 
national security powers. Unlike constitutional powers, these statutory 
powers were granted by Congress and can be limited by Congress.20 The 
novelty of this Article lies in both its categorization of different types of 
procedural constraints that Congress has already imposed on presidents, 
and its defense of their merits when narrowly tailored to the type of 
national security threat that triggers a president’s statutory powers.21 By 
                                                                                                                     
Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 565 (2001) 
(“The President’s pardon power, on the other hand, is largely unfettered by substantive 
or procedural constraints.”); Liaquat Ali Khan, A Portfolio Theory of Foreign Affairs: U.S.  
Relations with the Muslim World, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 406 (2011) (stating 
that statutory constraints act as barriers in a president’s attempt to change the foreign policy 
statutory portfolios launched by prior administrations and fortified with federal statutes); Heidi 
Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (2010) (evaluating the exclusivist narrative, which posits that throughout 
most of American history, Congress respected presidential exclusivity, imposing few statutory 
constraints on presidential powers over foreign affairs or national security); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 
97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263–64 (1988) (explaining that a number of statutes enacted in the 1970s 
delegated foreign affairs authority to President while subjecting the exercise of such authority to 
procedural constraints; however, by the late 1980s, it had become clear that the Executive was 
“paying only lip service” to these procedural constraints); Jason Luong, Forcing Constraint: The 
Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 
1201 (2000) (“[A] . . . deferential federal judiciary has effectively nullified the limited statutory 
constraints imposed by the [International Emergency Economic Powers Act] and the [National 
Emergency Act].”); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: 
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 
1252 (2003) (finding it unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow Congress to impose 
procedural restrictions related to pardons on the President directly); Zachary S. Price, Funding 
Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 358 (2018) (evaluating 
congressional control over “resource-dependent” executive powers—including war powers and 
law enforcement—through their “near-plenary authority to restrict or condition use of available 
resources” relied upon to execute such powers); Stack, Reviewability, supra note 1, at 1205 
(noting that the President is generally “subject to very limited procedural constraints”); Stack, 
Statutory President, supra note 1, at 588 (noting that procedural constraints on the president are 
rare, and that “the few procedural constraints [Congress] [has] impose[d] are merely consulting 
and reporting requirements”); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 263, 314–15 (2010) (“[T]he potential negative of statutory constraints is often 
blunted by executive branch claims that the constraints must be interpreted in light of powers 
reserved to Congress or to the president.”); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1106–31 (2009) (describing “black holes” and “grey holes”—domains 
in which the Executive is either explicitly or implicitly exempt from legal constraints—in national 
security law cases). 
 20. See, e.g., discussion infra Section III.C.1. 
 21. A few others have explored the merits of statutory constraints on a president. See 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 210–12 (1990) (arguing for the imposition of procedural constraints on the 
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providing this consideration and incorporating the results clearly in the 
statute, Congress would provide the courts with both a textual and 
legislative history that could support future review.  
This Part also acknowledges and responds to a few of the major 
theoretical and practical challenges for such a proposal, including unitary 
executive theories,22 the conflation of constitutional and statutory 
authorities unique to the President, and the dependency on the judiciary 
to enforce such constraints. It nevertheless finds that the accountability 
and transparency merits of this proposal justify a more thoughtful 
analysis of the nuances of statutory national security powers that reflects 
a more appropriate statutory national security balance between the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches.  
In conclusion, this Article proposes a sliding scale of procedural 
constraints, tailored to the degree of the national security threat, that 
Congress could impose more systematically. Together, this provides 
Congress with a framework by which to identify the appropriate level of 
constraint for different situations. This proposal recognizes that not all 
national security threats are created equal, for the first time adopting a 
distinction between acute and chronic national security threats and 
tailoring the procedural constraints accordingly. Although this Article 
limits its reach to national security powers, there are much broader 
implications for the intersection of separation of powers and 
administrative law. 
I.  COMPLICATIONS OF A “STATUTORY NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENT” 
The Constitution of the United States divides the war powers of the 
federal government between the Legislative and Executive Branches: 
                                                                                                                     
President in the execution of foreign policy initiatives); David Gray Adler, George Bush and the 
Abuse of History: The Constitution and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 130 (2007) (arguing that the Commander in Chief Clause does not support 
an assertion of inherent executive power; rather, the President is limited by the Constitution and 
statutory constraints); Gus H. Buthman, Note, Signing Statements and the President’s Non-
Enforcement Power, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 103, 129 (2007) (arguing that failing to impose 
procedural constraints on presidential exercise of non-enforcement power would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine). 
 22. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (1994) (defining the unitary Executive as “a hierarchical 
executive branch, with the President in charge of all administration of the laws” (quoting 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1994))); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755 (1996) 
(explaining that “a truly unitary executive” means no “legislative involvement in the manner in 
which the executive executes the laws”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245, 2247 (2001) (defining the unitary Executive as “a system in which all of what now 
counts as administrative activity is controllable by the President”). 
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Article I provides Congress with the power to declare war23 and to raise 
and support the armed forces,24 while Article II establishes the President 
as Commander in Chief of the armed forces25 and directs the President 
with the Take Care Clause.26 But as others have noted, “the precise 
boundaries and balance of power between the Congress and the President 
are left largely undefined,” reducing their usefulness in actual disputes 
about executive power.27 As Justice Jackson has remarked, “[a] judge, 
like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful 
and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive 
power as they actually present themselves.”28 
These ambiguities about executive power have rendered it a 
particularly fruitful area of scholarly analysis, particularly with regard to 
national security. Many scholars have focused on the grand constitutional 
issues such as the war powers that the Constitution divides between the 
Executive and Legislative Branches.29 Some have focused on the famous 
presidential uses of emergency powers during times of war, including 
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus justified by the 
rebellion,30 President Franklin Roosevelt’s order requiring Japanese 
Americans to be interned during World War II,31 and President Harry 
                                                                                                                     
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 1 note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (“In strictly domestic matters, 
Congress enacts laws and the President takes care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). 
 27. Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative 
State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1922–23 (2012). 
 28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 29. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 725 (2001) (“War powers disputes are 
constitutionally unique, however, because the Constitution itself commits the resolution of those 
disputes to legislators and the chief executive.”); Katharine A. Wagner, Little v. Barreme: The 
Little Case Caught in the Middle of a Big War Powers Debate, 10 J.L. SOC’Y 77, 85 (2008) 
(discussing how Little v. Barreme balances opinions of “those adhering to a strong congressional 
role in war and by those advocating greater deference to an inherent presidential power in time of 
emergency”). 
 30. Compare Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863), with Ex 
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that, under the 
Constitution, the President cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because the 
Constitution gives that power to Congress alone), and Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 606 (2009) (discussing how decisions of such magnitude 
(i.e., whether to suspend a privilege) should not be decided by one branch alone but should be 
reviewed by both the President and Congress). 
 31. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942); see also Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (holding that the President and Congress had the 
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Truman’s efforts to nationalize private steel mills during the Korean 
War.32   
This Article is different. Colin Diver has divided the President’s 
functions into three parts: policy leader, manager, and delegate.33 
Whereas many scholars approach executive complications associated 
with the President’s role as policy leader34 or manager,35 this Article 
focuses on the President as delegate. Diver’s conception of the 
President’s unique role as a “delegate” when he carries out specific 
responsibilities conferred by statute is “the least visible and least elevated 
in the President’s repertoire.”36 This Part demonstrates that a significant 
amount of statutory delegations to the President involve national security. 
It then provides some illustrations of the varying types of national 
security authority that have been delegated to the President by Congress 
and highlights the definitional ambiguity surrounding these statutory 
grants. This delegation of national security powers adds a layer of 
complexity to an already underexplored element of the President’s role 
as delegate. Importantly, this Part provides evidence of the extremely 
broad and unbounded national security powers provided to the President 
by Congress. 
                                                                                                                     
power to exclude American citizens from certain areas based on their race because of a pressing 
public necessity for safety), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Francis P. 
Sempa, The Wartime Presidency, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25, 44 (2009) (“Nor do I think that the 
Constitutional difficulty plagued him. The Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime 
President. That was a question of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide. And 
meanwhile—probably a long meanwhile—we must get on with the war.” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 48, 191–
92 (1998))). 
 32. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585, 587 (holding that President Truman did not have the 
power to seize the steel mills, despite the existence of a “national emergency,” and that the 
President’s power to issue an order must stem from an act of Congress or the United States 
Constitution); see also Brendan Flynn, The War Powers Consultation Act: Keeping War out of 
the Zone of Twilight, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1012, 1026 (2015) (discussing how legal 
academics generally fall into one of two camps when discussing war powers—“Congress-First” 
or “President-First”—and how “President Truman's decision to greatly expand executive 
authority with respect to taking the nation to war gave his successors a powerful tool for exercising 
executive war-making capabilities”); Sempa, supra note 31, at 45 (“He did this without 
congressional authorization, relying on his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief.”). 
 33. Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 521–22 (1987). 
 34. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on 
Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential 
Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006). 
 35. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, 
Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 396 (2010). 
 36. Diver, supra note 33, at 521. 
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A.  Statutory National Security Power 
Although many are familiar with the idea that assertions of 
presidential authority are not necessarily constitutionally based, this first 
section highlights just how much of the President’s national security 
authority stems from statutes. Congress has included a reference to 
“national security” in over 2,100 statutes37 and “national emergency” in 
over 800 statutes.38 Almost 400 statutes discuss national security 
authority provided to the President, as opposed to other agents of the 
government, and over sixty provide the President with explicit power to 
act in the name of national security.39  
                                                                                                                     
 37. An advanced search on Westlaw for “national security” % PR,CA,TE,CR(rescind! 
Resciss! Repeal! omit!) produced all statutes that say “national security” while omitting any 
statutes that state any form of the words “rescind, rescission, repeal, or omit” in the prelim, 
caption, text, or credit. This search generated 2,179 federal statutes that referenced “[n]ational 
security” that had not been repealed or omitted at this time. Even this is an underestimate, given 
that there are other terms intended to address national security that do not use that explicit term 
and would not be captured by this search. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 4552(11) (Supp. IV 2017), which 
defines the term “homeland security,” 50 U.S.C. § 4552(14) (Supp. IV 2017), which defines 
“national defense,” and infra note 384, which discusses President Trump’s interpretation of 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States” as a national security statute.   
 38. An advanced search on Westlaw for “national emergency” % PR,CA,TE,CR(rescind! 
Resciss! Repeal! omit!) produced all statutes that say “national emergency” while omitting any 
statutes that state any form of the words “rescind, rescission, repeal, or omit” in the prelim, 
caption, text, or credit. This search generated 812 federal statutes that referenced “[n]ational 
emergency” and had not been repealed or omitted at this time. 
 39. A search for “President” within the same sentence as “national security” in the U.S.C.A. 
resulted in 392 federal statutes that referenced presidential authorities relating to “national 
security.” Thirty results gave the President the power to create exceptions, waivers, or suspend 
provisions in the name of national security, and thirty-four gave the President authority in the 
name of national security. Even back in 1939, a congressionally requested broader search for war 
powers resulted in “the Attorney General list[ing] ninety-nine such separate statutory grants by 
Congress of emergency or wartime executive powers.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 348 (1939)). 
Although the scope of this Article is largely limited to “national security” statutes, the list is even 
broader when the search extends to statutes that provide the President with authorities to declare 
and address a “national emergency” See, e.g., A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (last updated Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
analysis/emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/C74W-7WWT] (identifying 136 statutory powers 
that may be available to the President upon declaration of a national emergency, 94 of which can 
be used by a President without any restrictions or constraints). In this respect, this article’s focus 
on “national security” may be both over and under inclusive, but it provides a starting place for 
considering the universe of statutes that may need reconsideration. Future work would be required 
to address the many statutory nuances of national security, national emergencies, and those with 
similar impacts but without such distinct terms.  
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A number of national security provisions provide the President with 
broad and significant powers, including the power to reject sanctions,40 
to waive sanctions for “a significant foreign narcotics trafficker,”41 to 
waive the prohibition against involuntary extension of enlistments of 
military personnel,42 to waive attachment of foreign property to satisfy 
judgments,43 and to deny a request to inspect facilities in the United 
States.44 All of these provisions are based solely on a unilateral finding 
of a national security threat devoid of accountability requirements. These 
powers are often expansive, allowing the President to control whether or 
not private business enterprises can receive loans,45 to build a temporary 
air base or fortification on private land,46 to take control over 
communications or energy facilities,47 to ration production or use of 
critical products,48 and to instruct the Secretary of Transportation to make 
                                                                                                                     
 40. See 50 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III 2016) (“The President shall not apply 
sanctions under this section—(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or defense 
services— . . . (C) if the President determines that such articles or services are essential to 
the national security under defense coproduction agreements . . . .”). 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 1903(g)(1) (2012) (“The President may waive the application to a 
significant foreign narcotics trafficker of any sanction authorized by this chapter if 
the President determines that the application of sanctions under this chapter would significantly 
harm the national security of the United States.”). 
 42. See 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2012) (“[D]uring any period members of a reserve 
component are serving on active duty . . . , the President may suspend any provision of law relating 
to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the 
President determines is essential to the national security of the United States.”); Santiago v. 
Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549, 557–59 (9th Cir. 2005) (authorizing the President’s extension of 
enlistment of a National Guard sergeant where the President determined that he was essential to 
national security and the President had issued a proclamation declaring a national emergency); 
Sherman v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 385, 387 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (explaining that the President 
is authorized to “extend the enlistment of members of the armed forces, regular or reserve, if and 
when ‘members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to an order to active 
duty’”). 
 43. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) (2012) 
(allowing the President to issue a waiver of the attachment of property of foreign states in actions 
to enforce judgments against them “in the interest of national security”); Alejandre v. Republic of 
Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (S.D. Fla.), vacated sub nom. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga 
Distancia, de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Oren Eisner, 
Note, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential Interpretations of Ambiguities in Foreign 
Affairs and National Security Statutes Delegating Lawmaking Power to the President, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 419–20 (2001) (discussing that the President is authorized to waive 
requirements of § 1610 in the interest of national security, which applies to foreign attached 
property). 
 44. 22 U.S.C. § 6727 (2012). 
 45. 50 U.S.C. § 4532 (Supp. III 2016). 
 46. 10 U.S.C. § 9776 (2012). 
 47. 47 U.S.C. § 606 (2012). 
 48. 50 U.S.C. § 4511 (Supp. IV 2017). 
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rules and regulations governing anchorage and movement in U.S. waters 
that may include inspecting or seizing vessels49—all in the name of 
national security. Because these are express statutory authorizations, a 
court’s analysis of these presidential actions is likely to fall into the 
highest and most deferential Youngstown category.50 
A significant number of these statutory national security powers are 
delegated to the President without any discernible limits. For example, 
Congress has provided the President with the authority to force members 
of the armed forces to receive “an investigational new drug or a drug 
unapproved for its applied use” without the member’s consent “if 
the President determines, in writing, that obtaining consent is not in the 
interests of national security.”51 Although forced vaccines appear to be 
the driving force behind this statutory authority,52 one would hope that 
forced experimental drugs would be justified by something more than a 
written determination devoid of a substantive standard by which to 
measure any justifications. Similarly, the President can allow Coast 
Guard vessels to be constructed in a foreign shipyard “when the President 
determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States 
to do so.”53 But the statute provides no guidance to the President on what 
it means to be in the “national security interest of the United States.”54 
This void, combined with express authorization, suggests that a court 
would likely default to extreme discretion to the President in such 
instances. 
Public utilities are particularly vulnerable to these types of 
presidential national security actions evoked during times of national 
emergency. Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1934,55 for 
example, provides the President with authority to (1) suspend or amend 
the rules and regulations applicable to any or all jurisdictional 
telecommunications facilities or stations; (2) close any facility or station 
for wire communication and remove its equipment; and (3) allow the 
government to take control over any such facility or station, provided the 
government pay just compensation to the owners for the use of such 
                                                                                                                     
 49. 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2012). 
 50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). See infra note 149 for a discussion of the three Youngstown categories. 
 51. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(i)(4) (2012) (similarly requiring such informed consent). 
 52. Exec. Order No. 13,139, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,175 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
 53. 14 U.S.C. § 665(b) (2012) (“The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such 
determination.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.). 
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private property.56 The statutory trigger for the President to exercise this 
authority is a proclamation by the President that “there exists war or a 
threat of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national 
emergency, or in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States.”57 
In a rare case assessing whether the conditions were necessary to trigger 
this statutory power, an Illinois court upheld the President’s taking 
control over the telephone systems during World War I as a decision lying 
“wholly within [his] discretion” and immunized executive agents 
implementing this authority from injunction.58  
Even broader than the Telecommunications Act, the Federal Power 
Act59 allows the President to take control over any energy project for “any 
other purpose involving the safety of the United States.”60 Unlike the 
Telecommunications Act, the exercise of this power is not conditioned 
on a declaration of national emergency, but on another ambiguous 
national security term, “the safety of the United States.”61 What exactly 
does that mean and what would a challenge to the President’s exercise of 
this authority look like? 
Presidents primarily exercise these statutory national security powers 
through the use of executive orders.62 Most executive orders contain a 
catch-all constitutional provision as a source of their authority to act on 
national security matters, with many also citing to at least one statutory 
provision.63 As an example of such concurrent authority, President 
Obama’s executive order on cybersecurity reads: 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
                                                                                                                     
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 606(d), (e) (2012). 
 57. Id. § 606(c). 
 58. Read v. Cent. Union Tel. Co., 213 Ill. App. 246, 254, 255 (1919) (“[T]he power of the 
Government in the prosecution of a war . . . is supreme . . . .”). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
16 U.S.C.). 
 60. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 809 (2012) (“When in the opinion of the 
President . . . the United States shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of any project 
or part thereof, constructed, maintained, or operated under said license, for the purpose of 
manufacturing nitrates, explosives, or munitions of war, or for any other purpose involving the 
safety of the United States . . . [the government] shall pay . . . just and fair compensation . . . .”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (describing the use of executive orders by different presidents throughout 
history); Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2030–31 (2015) 
(discussing executive orders and their enforceability); Steven Ostrow, Enforcing Executive 
Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 659, 664–65 (1987) (“[E]xecutive orders have become an important weapon in 
the arsenal of presidential policymaking.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
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including the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 
212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 
U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States 
Code . . . .64 
But a number of executive orders rely on the “Constitution and the 
laws of the United States” without reference to any specific statutory 
authority.65 Appendix A provides examples of three and a half years of 
executive orders related to national security, as well as the President’s 
stated source of authority.66 Out of thirty executive orders, almost half of 
them were issued by a president acting under statutory authority.67 One of 
the critical implications of all of these statutory delegations of national 
security power is that all of these statutes involve the President making a 
national security finding. 
B.  The Challenge of Defining National Security 
Although Congress frequently delegates national security authority to 
the President, it rarely defines the critical terms. In fact, national security 
has proved to be a slippery term. Although “national security” is used in 
over a thousand federal statutes, Congress has rarely included it as a 
defined term.68 In fact, a search on Westlaw for “national security” as a 
defined term produced only three examples.69 Two of the statutes define 
national security as “the national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States,”70 while the third statute defines it as “the national defense, 
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.”71 Though it 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,811 (Oct. 7, 2011) (“By the authority 
vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . .”). 
 66. See infra Appendix A. 
 67. See infra Appendix A. 
 68. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2012)); see also David Scott Nance & Jessica 
Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment in the United States on National 
Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 926, 935 (1990) (“Significantly, the phrase ‘threaten to 
impair the national security’ is neither defined nor discussed in the statute or in the agency’s 
regulations. Nor is there any meaningful discussion of the standard in the legislative history. This 
omission highlights the extent to which determination under section 232 were intended to be 
discretionary, and emphasizes the flexibility accorded both the ITA and the President in making 
such determinations.” (footnote omitted)).  
 69. A search in the USCA on Westlaw for “national security” within 250 words of 
“definition,” using the search terms “national security” /250 definition, yielded 421 statutes. 
 70. 10 U.S.C. § 801(16) (2012); Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1(b) (2012). 
 71. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (2012). 
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does not define “national security” explicitly, 50 U.S.C. § 3003(5) defines 
“intelligence related to national security” as involving “(i) threats to the 
United States, its people, property, or interests; (ii) the development, 
proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other 
matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.”72 Very 
few courts have attempted to define the term, and even fewer cases have 
been litigated with an intention of gauging the meaning of the trigger of 
statutory power.73 
Section 721(f) of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 
2007 (FINSA)74 also provides eleven categories to help guide a 
determination of what constitutes national security: (1) domestic 
production for national defense; (2) capability and capacity of domestic 
industries for national defense; (3) control of domestic industries by 
foreign citizens; (4) potential effects of military sales; (5) potential effects 
of international technology leadership transactions; (6) critical 
infrastructure, including energy; (7) critical technologies; (8) foreign 
government-controlled transactions; (9) transactions with a country with 
questionable compliance with nonproliferation controls and cooperation 
with the United States on terrorism; (10) long-term needs for energy and 
other critical resources; and (11) any other factors the President or 
Committee deem appropriate.75 But such guidance gives little assistance 
in determining whether an activity within any of these categories rises to 
the level of a national security threat. 
Similar complications arise when researching national emergency 
powers. Although a “national emergency” is often defined as a 
declaration of emergency by the President or Congress,76 there are a 
number of references to “emergencies” that are much broader, including 
natural disasters,77 a significant home energy supply disruption,78 or “any 
occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, 
Federal assistance is needed.”79  
                                                                                                                     
 72. 50 U.S.C. § 3003(5) (Supp. II 2015). 
 73. See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 538, 544 (1956); but see Laura K. Donohue, The 
Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1577–78 (2011). 
 74. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 
246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (Supp. III 2016)). 
 75. Id. at 253–54 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(f)).  
 76. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1064(c)(3) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 98h-3(2) (2012); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1098ee(4) (2012). 
 77. 49 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(2) (2012). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 8622(1)(B) (2012). 
 79. Id. § 5122(1). President Trump’s recent indications that he could use his statutory 
authority under the National Emergencies Act to build a border wall is yet another example of a 
presidential stretch of statutory interpretation of a “national emergency.” Eli Watkins, et al., 
Trump: ‘May declare a national emergency’ to build wall, CNN (Jan. 7, 2019, 9:44 AM), 
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These definitional analyses are further complicated by the blurring 
distinctions between related terms like war and non-war80 and foreign and 
domestic national security threats.81 Courts disagree about what 
conditions must exist for the nation to be considered at war. For example, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts created a test to 
determine if a conflict constitutes a war for the purposes of the Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act (the WSLA).82 This test included the 
following factors: 
(1) the extent of the authorization given by Congress to the 
President to act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a “war” 
under accepted definitions of the term and the rules of 
international law; (3) the size and scope of the conflict 
(including the cost of the related procurement effort); and (4) 
the diversion of resources that might have been expended on 
investigation frauds against the government.83  
Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
California came to the opposite conclusion in United States v. Western 
Titanium, Inc.,84 holding that the term “at war” encompassed “only those 
wars which have been formally declared by Congress.”85 Even the 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/06/politics/adam-schiff-trump-wall-cnntv/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3GQ3-BKCK] (“I may declare a national emergency [to secure money for a 
border wall between the U.S. and Mexico] dependent on what’s going to happen over the next 
few days . . . .”).  
 80. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 8 (2012) 
(“[W]artime has become normal time in America. . . . Wartime has become the only kind of time 
we have, and therefore is a time within which American politics must function.”); Claire Jabbour, 
Combating Impunity: Contractor Liability for Torture During Times of War Under the Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 137, 138 (2015) (“In 2008, Congress 
redefined war . . . to include a modern interpretation; war is not limited to official declarations, 
but it also includes congressional or presidential authorizations of military force. Numerous wars 
have occurred between the end of WWII and 2008, all without formal declarations of war by 
Congress.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533 (1985) (distinguishing surveillance of 
foreign threats to national security from surveillance of domestic threats to national security); see 
also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 376–77  
(2005); Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 14–15 (2000) 
(proposing six categories within the Youngstown framework, further distinguishing between 
foreign and domestic national security affairs). 
 82. United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449, 454–55 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 83. Id. at 449. 
 84. No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 WL 2650224 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). 
 85. Id. at *3. 
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Supreme Court has noted that the answer to whether the nation is at war 
may change depending on the context.86 
As the social and technological landscapes of the United States 
develop and change, the methods of war change as well. With the rise of 
technology, the weapons of “cyber war” have become equally, if not 
more, devastating—with the added bonus of never having to leave the 
country.87 “Thus, [the] lack of perceptibility and the general sense of 
detachment citizens feel from cyber-related activities could allow for the 
U.S. Government, at the sole direction of the President, to prepare for and 
engage in a perpetual state of cyber war.”88 As just one example, the 
recent indictment against thirteen Russian nationals for interference in 
the 2016 presidential elections89 has been described as an “act of war.”90 
In short, the ease of initiating cyberattacks has begun to blur the lines 
between when the country is at war and peace.91 The fact that “war” is no 
longer reserved solely for nations, but now also includes non-state actors, 
has also changed the landscape of what constitutes modern-day war.92 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959) (“Congress in drafting laws may decide that 
the Nation may be ‘at war’ for one purpose, and ‘at peace’ for another. It may use the same words 
broadly in one context, narrowly in another.”). 
 87. Tyler K. Lowe, Mapping the Matrix: Defining the Balance Between Executive Action 
and Legislative Regulation in the New Battlefield of Cyberspace, 17 SCHOLAR 63, 90 (2015). For 
example, Russia is allegedly hacking into databases and email systems of the U.S. Departments 
of Defense and State to obtain personnel information, as well as targeting the electric grids. 
Deborah Barfield Berry & Erin Kelly, States Move to Protect Voting Systems from Russia with 
Little Help from Congress, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2018/02/16/states-move-protect-voting-systems-russia-little-help-congress/ 
338411002/ [https://perma.cc/S8QZ-5RB6]; Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases 
Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-
system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/?utm_term=.831b264f735a 
[https://perma.cc/5CPW-TRS9]; David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Appear to Shift Focus to U.S. 
Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/ 
russian-hackers-electric-grid-elections-.html [https://perma.cc/EG4Q-NLM7]. 
 88. Lowe, supra note 87. 
 89. See generally Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-
00032-DLF, 2018 WL 914777 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018) (putting forth the specific charges against 
each Russian for interference in the election). 
 90. Natasha Bertrand, Mueller’s Indictment Puts Details Behind Claims of Russian 
Interference, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/ 
muellers-indictment-reveals-details-of-russian-election-interference/553625/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3PCD-CD4W]. 
 91. John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, 
105 CAL. L. REV. 443, 446 (2017). 
 92. Id. at 458 (“States no longer have a monopoly on international violence that can rise to 
the level of armed conflict. . . . By expanding the area of conflict and employing asymmetric, 
unconventional tactics and weapons, al-Qaeda showed that nonstate actors could wield the 
destructive power once held only by national militaries. . . . The evolution of nonstate actors into 
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Others note the persistence of this definitional problem, and that “it is all 
the more troubling in an era in which wars are increasingly being fought 
by and against individuals who are members of loosely organized groups, 
under no formal military command, who wear no uniforms, and who 
never have and likely never will sign an international protocol or 
treaty.”93 Even the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.94 made a distinction between international and domestic 
problems, suggesting that domestic national security issues may be 
treated with less deference or more procedural constraints than foreign 
national security issues.95 
Multiple sources discuss the inability of the government to define 
“national security” for multiple reasons, including the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which has stated that “national 
security defies precise definition because it is preambulary in nature.”96 
Cole v. Young97 remains one of the only Supreme Court cases where the 
Court tried to define “national security” as it was used in the Summary 
Suspension Act.98 That statute provided the “heads of certain departments 
and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unreviewable 
dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when deemed necessary 
‘in the interest of the national security of the United States.’”99 Although 
the Court affirmed the President’s extension of this removal power to 
employees of all Government agencies,100 including the plaintiff in that 
case, who had been discharged for his association with communists,101 
the Court held that “national security” had to actually concern the safety 
of the nation and not be a simple catch-all for general welfare.102 The 
                                                                                                                     
organized, military operatives contributes a more general uncertainty of what constitutes ‘war’ in 
the modern era.”). 
 93. Gordon Silverstein & John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of 
War and Crisis, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1453, 1456 (2009). 
 94. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 95. Id. at 319–29. This foreign/domestic distinction can also be found in the Fourth 
Amendment context. See United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Southern Division, 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972) (holding that a judicial warrant must 
issue before the government may engage in electronic surveillance of domestic threats to national 
security, but “express[ed] no opinion as to [the surveillance of the] activities of foreign powers”).  
 96. Am. Sec. Council Ed. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 456 & n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“One 
could no more define with specificity ‘national security’ than one could define ‘a more perfect 
Union,’ ‘Justice,’ ‘domestic Tranquility,’ ‘the common defence,’ ‘the general Welfare,’ ‘the 
Blessings of Liberty,’ or, for that matter, ‘the pursuit of Happiness.’”). 
 97. 351 U.S. 536 (1956). 
 98. Id. at 538. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 542. 
 101. Id. at 540.  
 102. Id. at 544.  
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Court ruled that the term “national security” was used in the Act in a 
definite and limited sense, relating to activities “directly concerned with 
the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign 
aggression, and not those which contribute to the strength of the Nation 
only through their impact on the general welfare.”103 
Those seeking to challenge any such executive orders that rely on 
statutory power need to overcome hurdles related to standing,104 the 
political question doctrine,105 separation of powers,106 and other threshold 
questions.107 These issues are not addressed in this Article, but they have 
been addressed in depth elsewhere. Even if plaintiffs prevail on such 
threshold questions, the lack of statutory definitions leaves substantial 
ambiguity surrounding a president who invokes these powers.108 
This lack of statutory definition is particularly troubling where 
Congress conditions a presidential exercise of authority upon a national 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Id. If Congress intended “interest of the national security” to be equated with the general 
welfare of the United States, Congress would not have limited the Act to the enumerated agencies. 
Id. at 544–45. 
 104. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 608–09 (2007); Utah 
Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1098 (10th Cir. 2006); Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 
112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 
1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ostrow, supra note 62, at 669–70 (explaining that courts have found 
standing to enforce agency actions that fail to comply with an executive order). 
 105. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962) (holding that a political question 
would exist in a case where there is an “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”); Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political 
departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and 
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for 
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which [have] long been 
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”); El-
Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (precluding the 
claim against the President’s decision to launch a strike as being consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution, the court held that “the decision to take military action is a ‘policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217)). 
 106. No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 352 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (citing separation of 
powers as the basis of their decision).  
 107. See generally Newland, supra note 62 (discussing the challenges involved with judicial 
review of executive orders). Additionally, courts have held that citizens cannot sue for the 
enforcement of an executive order that finds its power under Article II of the Constitution, making 
it more difficult for Congress to know which executive orders are still valid. Id. at 2076. But see 
Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612 
(1997) (arguing that nonstatutory review, which avoids the sovereign immunity of the United 
States by making the fictional assumption that a suit against a government officer is not against 
the government, could be used against the President). 
 108. See Newland, supra note 62, at 2053–54. 
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security finding. With undefined terms and broad delegated powers, a 
president is free to make the requisite finding with limited accountability. 
Judicial review remains the most likely opportunity for providing a check 
on a statutory Executive, but, as discussed below, the lack of a defined 
deference standard—combined with historical deference to the Executive 
on national security—neutralizes the hope that the judiciary will serve as 
an effective external constraint. Regardless of one’s constitutional 
philosophy on checks and balances, this situation should cause some 
concern. The lack of a more precise statutory definition results in a 
president who is unfettered when interpreting a statutory national security 
provision and courts that are uncertain in how to address challenges to a 
president’s exercise of statutory national security. This ambiguity in 
statutory terms related to national security necessarily leads to 
discussions about the proper level of deference provided to a president 
interpreting them. 
II.  THE DEFERENCE DILEMMA OF A STATUTORY NATIONAL 
SECURITY PRESIDENT 
Historically, presidents acting in the name of national security are 
provided great deference in the law.109 The deference analysis becomes 
even more complicated when a president is acting under statutory 
national security power.110 In these situations, Congress, a branch under 
the Constitution, has also been charged with shared authority over foreign 
affairs and national security, and has delegated specific powers to the 
President.111 This delegation raises many of the same administrative law 
questions that arise when an agency interprets a statute. Was there 
reasoned decision-making? What is the basis for this interpretation? How 
much deference should be provided to the President’s interpretation of a 
statute? Such an analysis could easily get tied up in a Curtiss-Wright, 
Youngstown, Chevron knot, and this is where most scholarship has placed 
its focus—deference.  
If these statutory provisions related to national security were to be 
interpreted by agencies, the problems would be constrained to the world 
                                                                                                                     
 109. “Deference—the substitution by a decisionmaker of someone else’s judgment for its 
own—is a pervasive tool of constitutional doctrine.” Horwitz, supra note 7, at 1061; accord infra 
Section II.A. 
 110. This analysis assumes that there is a clear grant of statutory national security authority 
at issue. It is even more complicated when the source of statutory authority is unclear, as in Regan 
v. Wald,  Snepp v. United States, and Haig v. Agee, where “inferences from executive power have 
prevailed over countervailing inferences from constitutional rights, with the result that 
congressional authorization of executive action has been found on the basis of unclear or 
fragmentary legislative materials.” Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 433 (1989). 
 111.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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of administrative law and Chevron deference. But, for better or worse, 
Congress often decides to delegate power directly to the President 
himself, particularly in matters of national security.112 Congress has been 
particular in choosing the procedures for invoking different statutory 
powers related to national security. In a number of statutes, Congress 
provides full authority to the head of an agency to assess the national 
security threat.113 In a number of other statutes, Congress provides a two-
tiered system under which the President acts only after being prompted 
by an agency.114 In yet a third category, Congress leapfrogs over the 
relevant agency head and provides full discretion to the President to 
initiate action as a response to a national security threat. It is this last 
category of statutory national security that is the focus of this Article. 
This Part explains the historical backdrop of the Statutory National 
Security President, then proceeds to explain how the deference to a 
president on national security actions is complicated by the Supreme 
Court’s holding that neither the APA nor Chevron applies to the 
President’s interpretation of a statute. Despite decades of analysis, the 
deference jurisprudence and scholarship leave a number of ambiguities 
surrounding presidential interpretation of a national security statute 
unresolved. 
A.  Constitutional National Security Deference 
The judiciary has spent the last century exploring the appropriate 
limits, if any, on a president acting “in the name of national security.” 
Before initiating a broader discussion focused on the Statutory National 
Security President, this Section provides the historical foundation, 
primarily based on a president’s constitutional national security powers, 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Koh, supra note 19, at 1263 (“The vast majority of the foreign affairs powers the 
President exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather, authorities that 
Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated to him by statute.”). 
 113. 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (2012) (“[T]he head of an agency may suspend without pay an 
employee of his agency when he considers that action necessary in the interests of national 
security. To the extent that the head of the agency determines that the interests of national security 
permit, the suspended employee shall be notified of the reasons for the suspension.”). Section 
824a of the Federal Power Act provides that the Department of Energy may determine that “an 
emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage 
of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel 
or water for generating facilities, or other causes, the Commission shall have authority, either 
upon its own motion or upon complaint, with or without notice, hearing, or report, to require by 
order such temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or 
transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the 
public interest.” 16 U.S.C § 824a(c)(1) (Supp. III 2016). 
 114. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (2012)).   
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from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,115 to Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.116  
On one side of the debate are those who adhere to Curtiss-Wright and 
national security exceptionalism, a concept that stems from the 
President’s near absolute constitutional powers over foreign affairs and 
national security, extreme deference to the President’s national security 
acts, and limited to no judicial review.117 National security 
exceptionalism applies different rules to executive decision-making in 
contexts where there is a perceived need to protect national security 
interests.118 Defenders of national security exceptionalism argue that 
policymaking in the national security context is fundamentally different 
and necessitates greater deference to the Executive as the authority on 
foreign policy and national security affairs.119 Many of these scholars 
point to political constraints as a sufficient check on the Executive in such 
situations.120 Some adherents to a unitary executive theory also find that 
external checks beyond the political process disrupt the President’s 
authority.121  
These supporters of a unitary Executive on national security also find 
strong support in the jurisprudence. Based on theories of national security 
exceptionalism and separation of powers, courts have rejected judicial 
review of executive orders where the President relies upon statutory 
power devoid of discernible limits or definitions. For example, a number 
of decisions hold that abuse of discretion claims against the President are 
                                                                                                                     
 115. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 116. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 117. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319–29; Sudha Setty, Obama’s National 
Security Exceptionalism, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91, 99–108 (2016). 
 118. SUDHA SETTY, NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2017); Setty, supra note 117, at 92. 
 119. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 
919 (2014); Setty, supra note 117, at 92. See generally, Margaret B. Kwoka, The Procedural 
Exceptionalism of National Security Secrecy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 103 (2017) (discussing the different 
procedural defaults available to decision makers who deal with national security issues). 
 120. See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 119, at 163–64 (discussing the importance of public 
oversight of governmental secrecy—especially that which surrounds national security); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 66 (2016) 
(discussing positive effects of short-term executive constraints, i.e. presidential productivity and 
public support for the Executive Branch). But see, e.g., Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the 
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385, 1431 (1989) (documenting the expansion of the 
Executive's emergency power to confront foreign dangers and proposing new directions for 
limiting emergency powers through development of a more multinational system).  
 121. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992); Kagan, supra note 22, at 2364; 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 97–99; Warren F. Schwartz & Wayne McCormack, The 
Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEX. L. REV.  
1033, 1045 (1968). 
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beyond the reach of judicial review, particularly during wartime.122 
During World War I, for example, Congress passed a resolution granting 
the President power to take possession and control of communication 
systems for the duration of the war “whenever he shall deem it necessary 
for the national security or defense.”123 In 1919, the Supreme Court in 
Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota124 declined to review the 
President’s exercise of this power, explaining that questions of potential 
abuse of executive discretion are beyond the reach of judicial review, and 
created the “reviewability doctrine.”125 Decades later, in Dalton v. 
Specter,126 the Supreme Court again held that “[w]here a statute, such as 
the [Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990], commits 
decisionmaking to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the 
President’s decision is not available.”127 Similarly, in In re Spier Aircraft 
Corp.,128 the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals withheld review of the 
President’s use of statutory authority to make requisitions of machinery 
tools “whenever he determines that the need is immediate and that ‘all 
other means of obtaining the use of such property upon fair and 
reasonable terms have been exhausted.’”129  
Supporters of national security exceptionalism also often point to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Curtiss-Wright, which stated that if “success 
for our aims [is to be] achieved, congressional legislation . . . within the 
                                                                                                                     
 122. See, e.g., Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 181, 183–84 (1919) 
(finding H.R.J. Res. 309, 65th Cong. (1918) properly vested the President with exclusive control 
of the telephone service during wartime); Motions Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (declining to review a president’s invocation of statutory authority in a non-
national security setting). 
 123. H.R.J. Res. 309; see also Dakota Cent., 250 U.S. at 181–83 (discussing H.R.J. Res. 309 
and the power it conferred upon the President); Motions Sys., 437 F.3d at 1361 (declining to 
review a president’s invocation of statutory authority in a non-national security setting). 
 124. 250 U.S. 163 (1919). 
 125. Id. at 184; see also Stack, Reviewability, supra note 1, at 1173 (“The reviewability 
doctrine represented in Dakota Central grew into a general barrier to review of the determinations 
that public officials, [including] the President, made to satisfy the conditions for exercising 
statutory powers.”). 
 126. 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
 127. Id. at 477; see also Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112 
(1948) (“We therefore agree that whatever of [the Civil Aeronautics Act] emanates from the 
President is not susceptible of review by the Judicial Department.”); United States v. George S. 
Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) (“No question of law is raised when the exercise of 
[presidential] discretion is challenged.”). 
 128. 137 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1943). 
 129. Id. at 739 (footnote omitted) (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 721 (1940)) (citing Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943)) (“The scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion 
by the President . . . to meet the exigencies of war is a wide one and it is not for the courts to sit 
in review of the action taken in organizing war effort at home or the operation of armed forces in 
direct contact with the enemy.”). 
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international field must often accord to the President a degree of 
discretion . . . which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved.”130 The deference accorded to the President in the international 
realm is based in Article II of the Constitution, which has often been 
interpreted to carry with it certain inherent powers to represent the nation 
in foreign matters and to protect security interests.131 Because of these 
inherent powers and the structure of Article II, the courts are highly 
deferential to the President when reviewing actions pursuant to statutes 
relating to “command of the armed forces, empowering him to act in 
foreign crises, and implementing treaties that he has negotiated.”132 
Although Curtiss-Wright did not involve the President’s statutory 
national security powers, scholars have argued that such a statutory 
delegation would further strengthen its deferential presumption.133 
Other scholars have noted the persistency of Curtiss-Wright’s strong 
deference to the President on national security matters, pointing to cases 
like Dames & Moore v. Regan,134 where the Supreme Court upheld an 
executive order by President Carter that suspended pending lawsuits of 
American citizens against Iran as part of his negotiations during the Iran 
Hostage Crisis.135 Even where the President’s executive orders harm U.S. 
citizens, as was the case here, courts are still prone to extreme deference 
where the domestic impacts are incidental to some larger foreign 
action.136 Important for our purposes, the Court analyzed the matter on 
statutory as opposed to constitutional grounds without explicit discussion 
of the President’s statutory power to suspend lawsuits against Iran.137 
                                                                                                                     
 130. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); accord Jide 
Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 943–44, 959 (2004). 
 131. See U.S. CONST. art. II; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322 (referencing the inherent power 
of the President to represent the nation in foreign affairs and to protect security interests as legal 
reason to defer to the judgment of the President); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100–01 (2008) (premising the Curtiss-Wright deference 
standard on the President’s Article II powers). 
 132. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 131, at 1164; accord Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 38–
39 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanagh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that the 
practice of judicial restraint when a president is acting pursuant to a national security provision of 
a statute “stems from at least three interpretive sources . . . one based on Article II of the 
Constitution”).  
 133. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 131 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320) (arguing 
that while Curtiss-Wright deference rests on authority granted by Article II, the level of deference 
increases when Congress delegates power pursuant to its Article I authority).   
 134. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 135. Id. at 686. 
 136. Brownell, supra note 81, at 104.  
 137. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680–82. Looking to Congress’s intent in passing federal 
statutes, such as the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, the Court reasoned 
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Instead, the Court relied on the statutory history of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Hostage Act to 
uphold the President’s sanctions, finding that “Congress acquiesced in 
the President’s action[s].”138 What Professor Harold Koh calls “executive 
initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance” ensures 
that “the President almost invariably wins in foreign affairs”—and 
national emergencies.139 Although courts have relied upon Curtiss-
Wright for the better part of a century for the proposition that the 
President retains certain extraconstitutional powers in matter of foreign 
affairs and national security,140 its influence has waned over time as 
judges and scholars alike have expressed skepticism about the notion of 
a president’s “inherent powers.”141 
                                                                                                                     
“Congress . . . implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.” Id. 
at 680. Supporting this decision was the Court’s decision in United States v. Pink (and implicitly 
United States v. Belmont), which recognized the President’s power to “enter into executive 
agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id. at 682 (citing United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) 
(“[T]he Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment 
and the agreement in connection therewith did not . . . require the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”); Landau, supra note 27, at 1945 (discussing the “expanded national security power[s]” 
given to the President by the Court in Dames & Moore). 
 138. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688. 
 139. Koh, supra note 19, at 1291. 
 140. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 380–81 & n.8 (2000) (“For prominent judicial citations of Curtiss-
Wright, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445–46 (1998) (citing Curtiss-Wright as 
evidence of the President’s broad discretion in foreign affairs); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 
509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (same); Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 354 n.28 
(1990) (quoting with approval Curtiss-Wright’s assertion of extraconstitutional power in foreign 
affairs); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (citing Curtiss-Wright in support of the 
President’s broad role in foreign affairs); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing Curtiss-
Wright as evidence of the federal government’s ‘broad authority over foreign affairs’); National 
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting with approval Curtiss 
Wright’s observations about extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs), aff’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2888 (2000); see also Velasquez 
v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392–93 (7th Cir. 1998) (referring to the inconclusive historical debate 
over Curtiss-Wright), vacated in part, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999).” (italics added)). 
 141. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (“Curtiss-
Wright did not hold that the President is free from Congress’s lawmaking power in the field of 
international relations.”); KOH, supra note 21, at 94 (describing the “withering criticism” of 
Curtiss-Wright); Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a 
Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 886 (1983) (“Commentators are in almost 
universal agreement . . . that ‘Sutherland uncovered no constitutional ground for upholding a 
broad, inherent, and independent power in foreign relations.’” (quoting Charles A. Lofgren, 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 
1, 30 (1973))); Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 
37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 149 (2007) (“Most of the scholarly studies of Curtiss-Wright in 
professional journals and books have been highly critical of Sutherland’s decision.”); Michael J. 
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Applying these national security principles to the Statutory National 
Security President, one might expect the President to be near bulletproof. 
But these judicial decisions have been narrowed by other cases which 
have found that there are many instances where judicial review of the 
President’s decision is appropriate.142 These cases provide ammunition 
for those concerned by an unfettered President, devoid of checks and 
balances, acting with a blank check on national security matters. Critics 
of national security exceptionalism argue that using a more deferential 
standard for national security policymaking threatens democratic 
values.143 They point to the inadequate safeguards against the President 
limited only by political constraints.144 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court 
famously struck down President Truman’s executive order that directed 
his Commerce Secretary to seize and take over the operation of most of 
the country’s steel mills during the Korean War.145 Fearing a strike by 
United Steelworkers of America, President Truman justified this order by 
stating that a halt in production of weapons and ammunition would 
                                                                                                                     
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 
13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 12 (1988) (“The first thing to be said about this breathtaking exegesis 
concerning ‘plenary powers’ is that it is the sheerest of dicta.”); Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional 
History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 572 n.46 (1938) (calling Curtiss-Wright 
a “perversion”); C. Perry Patterson, In re the United States v. the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 22 
TEX. L. REV. 286, 297 (1944) (describing Curtiss-Wright as “(1) contrary to American history; 
(2) violative of our political theory; (3) unconstitutional, and (4) unnecessary, undemocratic, and 
dangerous”); Ramsey, supra note 140, at 380 (“Much academic labor has been devoted to proving 
Curtiss-Wright wrong.”).  
 142. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952). 
 143. See Setty, supra note 117, at 91–92, 111–12. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1935–49, 1963, 
1972 (2015) (arguing that “[d]eclarations of blanket exceptionalism should no longer be a 
justification for divergent treatment” of foreign and domestic affairs).  
 144. See Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 1551, 1557 (2011) (“It is not enough to say that separation of powers is ‘obsolete,’ or that 
the political process is sufficient to check the modern executive (as some do) without also 
acknowledging the normative constraint of the executive’s constitutional responsibilities.” 
(footnote omitted)); David A. O’Neil, The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2007) (“There is no reason to believe—and, in fact, powerful reason to 
doubt—that the political process alone will yield a satisfactory allocation of authority . . . .”); 
Setty, supra note 117, at 106 (“Further, a variety of political and structural incentives have created 
a situation where exceptionalism reigns and accountability from Congress or the courts does not 
exist: ideological alignment with the president, concern that national security is an issue within 
the president’s sole jurisdiction, complacency, and an overly formalistic judiciary that chooses to 
defer to the president instead of engaging in its counter majoritarian obligation to protect 
fundamental rights have all contributed to the lack of engagement on the question of redress for 
violations of human and civil rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
 145. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 589; Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 
3139 (Apr. 8, 1952). 
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“immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense,”146 claiming 
authority under the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause.147 
Important for our purposes, the Supreme Court struck down the order in 
part because no statute authorized the President to take possession of 
private property, noting that presidential military power does not extend 
to labor disputes.148 
Although President Truman did not rely on any statutory powers in 
his efforts to nationalize steel mills, Justice Jackson’s famous concurring 
opinion provides a three-category framework for providing deference to 
a president acting under congressional authorization in times of national 
security, finding that statutory authority plays a critical role in the 
analysis.149 Justice Jackson’s concurrence suggests that statutory powers 
provide additional legitimacy beyond constitutional powers. As he noted, 
“[i]n view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can 
grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to 
embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we 
should affirm possession of them without statute.”150 
Courts have been especially willing to engage in more robust judicial 
review where constitutional rights are implicated. In Rostker v. 
Goldberg,151 for instance, the Supreme Court acknowledged that even for 
issues regarding national security, courts still have the “ultimate 
responsibility to decide the constitutional question.”152 In Holder v. 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139. 
 147. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587; Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 
3139; Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 601, 621 (2005).  
 148. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585–87. 
 149. The first category consists of situations where the President acts under direct express or 
implied statutory authorization. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). In these instances, actions are 
accorded “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Id. at 
637. The second category consists of situations where the President acts on an issue on which 
Congress is silent. Id. In those cases, the President “can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, 
or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Id. The third category consists of situations where the 
President acts directly contrary to the intent of Congress. Id. In those situations, the President’s 
claim to power must be “scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system.” Id. at 638; see also Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 
518, 530 (1988) (stating that “courts traditionally have been reluctant” to limit the President’s 
exercise of authority as it relates to foreign affairs “unless Congress specifically has provided 
otherwise”). 
 150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 653.  
 151. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 152. Id. at 67 (“We of course do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the 
constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference 
to congressional choice.”). 
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Humanitarian Law Project,153 the Supreme Court again reiterated the 
importance of the judiciary in reviewing presidential national security 
actions.154 The Court stated that litigation that “implicates sensitive and 
weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs” warrants 
deference to Congress’s authority over national defense and military 
affairs, but that “concerns of national security and foreign relations do 
not warrant abdication of the judicial role.”155 
B.  Statutory Presidential Deference 
Amidst this backdrop of judicial review of constitutional national 
security actions lies the added complications associated with reviewing 
presidential actions mingled with statutory national security authority. As 
expected, judicial review of these actions focuses largely on questions of 
deference.156 Although there are also questions associated with the degree 
of deference given to a president’s assessment of the relevant facts,157 this 
Section focuses on Chevron-like deference and the President’s 
authorization to interpret a statutory provision, including the triggers and 
limits of such authorization. 
                                                                                                                     
 153. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 154. Id. at 34. 
 155. Id. at 33–34 (“We do not defer to the Government's reading of the First Amendment, 
even when such interests are at stake. We are one with the dissent that the Government's ‘authority 
and expertise in these matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure 
the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals.’”); see also Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64–65 
(discussing the Court’s role in “judg[ing] the constitutionality of an Act of Congress”); United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (“We cannot accept the Government’s 
argument that internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts 
regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that 
federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic 
security cases.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 157. See Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1186 (D. Utah 2004) (explaining 
that, in reviewing the President’s action, courts do not have the authority to inquire into “the 
existence of facts on which [the President’s] discretionary judgment is based,” but do have a 
limited scope of review to “ensure [the President] was in fact exercising the authority conferred 
by the act”); Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1363 
(2009) (“[M]any arguments in favor of deference are unpersuasive, but that deference nonetheless 
may be justified in limited circumstances.”); Emily A. Kile, Note, Executive Branch Fact 
Deference as a Separation of Powers Principle, 92 IND. L.J. 1635, 1637–38 (2017) (citing 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015); Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)) (arguing Executive Branch fact deference serves the functionally same 
separation of powers role as political question doctrine); Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 801–07 
(“[T]he deference the Court appears to be exercising [in Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)] is 
not to an interpretation by the executive of its own legal authority, but rather to its assessment of 
the relevant facts . . . .”). 
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Long before Chevron, the Supreme Court doctrine evolved to reflect 
“the reviewability doctrine,” in which the Court “exclude[d] judicial 
review of the determinations or findings the President makes to satisfy 
conditions for invoking grants of statutory power.”158 In 1946, Congress 
enacted the APA, which allowed for review of these public officials.159 
Forty years later, the Supreme Court developed the Chevron doctrine, 
providing a two-part test for review of an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that provides agencies with significant deference.160 This led to a 
robust application of Chevron and mounds of scholarship exploring its 
implications for administrative law.161  
Yet just a few years after Chevron was decided, a lesser known 
Supreme Court case made an important clarification. In Franklin v. 
Massachusetts,162 the Supreme Court held that the APA does not 
authorize judicial review of presidential action.163 As Professor Evan 
Criddle has noted, the Court recognized that although 
“[t]he President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s 
purview,” it stressed that “he is not explicitly included, 
either,” and expressed concern that extending administrative 
procedure to presidential action could implicate “separation 
of powers and the unique constitutional position of 
the President.” In the absence of a particularly clear 
statement from Congress, the Court reasoned that it should 
not construe the APA to limit presidential lawmaking. The 
Court thus construed the APA to categorically exempt 
presidential lawmaking from the ordinary requirements of 
administrative procedure.164  
In the aftermath of Franklin, courts have determined that the 
President’s actions “are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under the 
APA,”165 and have declined to apply Chevron deference to presidential 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 1.  
 159. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 8, 60 Stat. 237, 242 (1946). 
 160. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 161. A search for law review articles with Chevron in the title results in 465 articles. See, 
e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its 
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
301 (1988). 
 162. 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
 163. Id. at 801. 
 164. Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative 
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 198–99 (2011) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800). 
 165. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 101 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting 
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801); accord Dettling v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128–29 (D. 
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interpretations of statutes.166 But if not Chevron, what deference? Should 
presidents receive more or less than Chevron deference from the courts? 
“In the absence of review under the APA, [some] courts have continued 
to apply this reviewability doctrine in suits challenging the President’s 
claims of statutory power.”167 
Many courts have invoked Justice Jackson’s scaled deference in place 
of applying Chevron deference.168 Courts often begin by asking whether 
a challenged presidential action is authorized by statute.169 Once the court 
finds authorization, the level of deference given to the President to 
interpret gaps or ambiguity within the statute varies.170 Courts strike 
down presidential action in the name of national security where it is 
overbroad.171 And where presidential action is contrary to a statute, for 
instance, triggering Justice Jackson’s third category and analysis, courts 
have found the President to have exceeded his authority.172 Many have 
                                                                                                                     
Haw. 2013); Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 
403 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 166. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The Court 
finds that the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chevron does not apply to the case at 
hand. . . . The President’s decision to exercise his waiver is given great deference by this Court; 
however, his interpretation of the breadth of that waiver cannot belie the legislative authority from 
which it stems. Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt the Government’s argument that it 
apply Chevron in order to defer to the President’s interpretation of section 117(d)’s waiver 
authority.”), vacated sub nom. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 
1277 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 167. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 1, at 1173. 
 168. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (“When interpreting a statute, a court ascertains what the statute 
means by looking at the text and employing various interpretive principles and canons of statutory 
construction.”); Landau, supra note 27, at 1948 (“[T]he Supreme Court has tended to return to the 
ordinary administrative law requirement of a delegation as a necessary [requirement] of judicial 
deference.”); Stack, Statutory President, supra note 1, at 557 (“In [Youngstown’s] framework, the 
question of whether the president acted with statutory authority is a critical trigger . . . .”).  
 169.  See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2009) (“It is [the] 
limited role [of the courts] to determine whether definitions crafted by either the Executive or the 
Legislative branch, or both, are consistent with the President’s authority . . . .” (quoting 
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008))). 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 69 (“Although there is some disagreement regarding the extent of the 
deference owed the Executive in this setting, it is beyond question that some deference is 
required.”).  
 171. See Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 616, 618–21 
(D.D.C. 1980) (striking down the President’s efforts to impose a ten cent per gallon “conservation 
fee” where the President argued that reliance on foreign oil threatened national security, but the 
court noted that such a conservation fee would affect all gasoline sales and the impact on imports 
would be only indirect).  
 172. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(finding the President had exceeded his authority under the Procurement Act in issuing an 
Executive Order barring federal contractors from hiring replacement workers during an economic 
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acknowledged the limitations of Youngstown,173 however, noting that the 
concurrence remains silent as to what level of deference courts should 
accord the President in interpreting statutes.174 
Courts and scholars have yet to agree on a uniform standard to apply 
in these situations. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,175 the Supreme Court 
declined to apply Chevron, instead invalidating a presidential order on 
the grounds that the order violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).176 The Court only allowed the Executive to provide factual 
materials relevant to the Court’s own interpretation, but the Court 
ultimately interpreted the statute.177 Writing for the majority, Justice John 
Paul Stevens stated that a lower degree of deference was due to the 
President’s determinations because of Congress’s choice of language in 
the statute at issue.178 The Court contrasted the language between two 
sections of the UCMJ, the first of which allows military-court rules to 
depart from federal-court rules whenever the President “considers” 
conformity impracticable, and the second of which requires uniformity 
across different military courts “insofar as practicable.”179 In his 
concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy found that the second section 
calls for a lower degree of presidential deference because the language 
does not ask for a subjective determination by the President of what he 
“considers” to be practicable.180 In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas 
advocated for “a heavy measure of [judicial] deference” to presidential 
interpretations of statutory grants of authority.181  
                                                                                                                     
strike because the Order was preempted by an independent statute, the National Labor Relations 
Act). 
 173. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1141–42 (“In a world of multiple and very vague 
statutory delegations bearing on national security, foreign relations, and emergency powers, 
judges have a great deal of freedom—not infinite freedom, of course—to 
assign Youngstown categories to support the decisions they want to reach, rather than reach 
decisions based on the Youngstown categories.”). 
 174. See id. at 1127 (“[Some] courts say that it is unsettled whether and when Chevron 
supplies the relevant framework for presidential and administrative interpretations of statutes 
bearing on national security and foreign relations.”); Stack, Statutory President, supra note 1, at 
557–59; see also Landau, supra note 27, at 1927 (noting the difficulties in determining whether 
presidential action is taken with overt or “implicit” congressional backing in the Youngstown 
analytical framework).  
 175. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
 176. Id. at 624–25; see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 131, at 1122 n.148 (“For 
example . . . the Court declined to apply the Chevron framework, notwithstanding strong 
arguments that . . . the President . . . [was] acting pursuant to congressional delegations of 
lawmaking authority.”).  
 177. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622–24.  
 178. Id. at 623–24.  
 179. Id. at 622 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)). 
 180. Id. at 640 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 181. Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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Other courts, however, have accorded the President Chevron-like 
deference and argued for a standard of review comparable to that applied 
to agency interpretations. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
v. Reich,182 the Chamber of Commerce brought an action challenging an 
executive order on the grounds that the order was contrary to the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Procurement Act, and the Constitution.183 The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the judicial 
deference accorded to the President’s interpretation of a statute granting 
his authority should be analogous to the deference given to agency 
interpretation of statutes which the agency administers.184 Citing 
Chevron, the court stated the President’s interpretation, “so long as it is 
reasonable and not inconsistent with the plain language of the statute,” is 
entitled to deference.185 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the district 
court’s application of Chevron to the President’s interpretation, but 
neither party challenged the court’s degree of deference.186 The D.C. 
Circuit again cited to Chevron in Al-Bihani v. Obama187 for the assertion 
that “in situations where deference to the Executive is considered 
appropriate, such as cases implicating national security—the court defers 
to the Executive’s authoritative interpretation of the statute if the 
Executive’s interpretation falls within [the] zone of reasonableness.”188  
In a separate statement, Circuit Judge Stephen Williams clarified that 
while he agreed that presidential interpretations are owed “great weight,” 
he did not “see much if any daylight between ‘great weight’ and the 
Chevron deference.”189 In addition, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia has used the rationale behind Chevron to argue for 
similar deference in presidential interpretation of a treaty.190  
                                                                                                                     
 182. 897 F. Supp. 570, rev’d, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 183. Id. at 573–74. 
 184. Id. at 577–78. 
 185. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)).  
 186. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 187. 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 188. Id. at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842–45); see also Landau, supra note 27, at 1976 & n.378 (stating that Al-Bihani is 
an example of a court giving “broad deference to the Executive Branch”).  
 189. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 55 (Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 190. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 556 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The rationale of 
Chevron is that a statutory ambiguity is essentially a delegation of authority by Congress to the 
reasonable agency to resolve the ambiguity. By analogy, treaty interpretation and application 
warrants similar Chevron deference to the President’s interpretation of a treaty, as American 
treaty-makers may be seen as having delegated this function to the President in light of his 
constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and overseas military operations.”).    
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Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,191 the Supreme Court extended 
Chevron-like deference toward a presidential interpretation of a 
statute.192 The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)193 grants 
the President with statutory authority to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force against . . . nations, organizations, or persons” 
associated with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.194 Although the 
statutory power was premised, in part, on “national security,”195 Congress 
required no showing by the President to exercise this broad authority. 
Accordingly, the President detained an enemy combatant indefinitely, 
arguing that the statutory authority included this implied power to 
detain.196 The Court upheld the President’s action based on the 
President’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory language despite the 
fact that there was explicit congressional authorization forbidding the 
United States from detaining a U.S. citizen “except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress.”197  
Scholars are similarly divided,198 but most seem to support the 
application of something akin to Chevron deference to the President.199 
                                                                                                                     
 191. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 192. Id. at 527.  
 193. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), as reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012).  
 194. Id. § 2(a); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17 (“The Government maintains that no 
explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary 
authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.”).  
 195. 115 Stat. at 224.  
 196. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17.   
 197. Id. at 517 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)); Landau, supra note 27, at 1951; cf. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”).  
 198. Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 783, 786 (expressing skepticism about Chevron’s ability to 
resolve the deference dilemma in foreign relations law); see, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or 
“The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 755–56 
(2007) (“[I]f the President is entitled to control what the administrator says the statute 
means, . . . we have a single, and infinitely political, generalist actor handcuffing the courts in 
their oversight of the administrative state.”). Strauss has compared each side of the argument: On 
one hand, if the President can decide statutory meaning, then this could be a persuasive “political 
response;” on the other hand, keeping the President out of agency statute interpretation keeps the 
“influence of raw politics” out of delegated responsibilities. Id. at 756; see also Note, Context-
Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597, 605 (2006) 
(“Primarily, commentators argue that reliance on the President’s interpretation of a statute would 
violate the separation of powers principle.”).  
 199. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 
VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1982) (“[C]ourts should defer to presidential statutory interpretations that are 
reasonable and consistent with ascertainable legislative intent, much as they do for agency 
heads.”); Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 271 (1993) (claiming that “[t]he President has the constitutional authority 
to insist on his own reading of Congress’s statutes rather than the agency’s” because of the 
obligation bestowed on him with the Take Care Clause); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law 
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A few have even explored Chevron’s application to statutory national 
security provisions.200 Much of Stack’s work on the “statutory President” 
argues that presidential actions with express statutory authorization 
should be subject to the APA and Chevron review.201 Others have 
questioned the quasi-legislative acts of presidents that have used statutory 
authority to take actions not contemplated by Congress;202 some explore 
the limits of deference to the President’s factual findings;203 some have 
argued for hard look review of foreign affairs actions;204 some focus on 
the courts’ role as observer;205 and others have supported the courts’ use 
of Article II to uphold presidential power to complete statutory schemes, 
which the President does by prescribing incidental details needed to 
execute a legislative scheme in the absence of congressional 
authorization to complete that scheme.206 Significant scholarship has also 
                                                                                                                     
Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Administrative Law] 
(noting that the President has a great deal of power to interpret ambiguities in congressional 
enactments—“in war no less than in peace,” but interpretive principles call for a narrow 
construction of presidential authority to invade constitutionally sensitive interests); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 
2603–04 (2005) (arguing for a reading of United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) that 
allows the President to qualify for Chevron deference). 
 200. Eisner, supra note 43 (arguing for Chevron deference for presidential national security 
statutory interpretation); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 131, at 1085–179 (providing a 
comprehensive treatment of deference to executive actors, including the President); Julian Ku & 
John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the 
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 195–97 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should have applied Chevron deference to the President’s interpretations of statutes and treaties 
in Hamdan); Landau, supra note 27, at 1949; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing 
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007) (“[C]ourts should defer to the 
executive’s judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable, or 
constitutionally questionable.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Stack, Statutory President, supra note 1, at 590–99. Stack made similar 
arguments with respect to reviews under Mead. Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 1, at 304–10 
(citing Mead, 533 U.S. 218). 
 202. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1789, 1820–21 (2015) (citing President Obama’s “We Can't Wait” initiative, President 
Obama’s directive to EPA to regulate climate change under the Clean Air Act, and President 
Clinton’s directive to the FDA to interpret the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to regulate tobacco 
as examples). 
 203. See supra notes 164, 167 and accompanying text. 
 204. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 489 (2014) 
(arguing that courts can use hard look review when reviewing foreign affairs). 
 205. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy 
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 827 (2013) (arguing that courts play 
an important role as observers). 
 206. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 
2280, 2280 (2006) (“[T]he completion power sheds light on a structural symmetry that cuts across 
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explored the limits on presidential power over administrative agencies 
and officials.207 In short, Stack rightly noted that “American public law 
has no answer to the question of how a court should evaluate the 
[P]resident’s assertion of statutory authority”208 and “neither Youngstown 
nor Justice Jackson articulated a framework for how a court is to judge 
whether the President’s claim of statutory power is valid.”209  
C.  The Limits of Deference 
This Article builds upon this important work by first recognizing the 
difficulties with judicial holdings that use ambiguous deference language. 
For instance, the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright stated that “if, in the 
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment . . . is to be 
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional 
legislation . . . must often accord to the President a degree of discretion 
and freedom from statutory restriction.”210 But as David Zaring 
questions, “what does ‘often’ mean? Should Congress always defer to the 
[P]resident in foreign affairs?”211  
These deference analyses are important, but these deference 
discussions suffer from some significant flaws. As a threshold matter, 
degrees of deference have always been difficult to discern. The mounds 
of scholarship trying to parse out the differences between Chevron, Auer 
v. Robbins,212 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United 
                                                                                                                     
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution – namely, that each of the three branches has some degree 
of inherent power to carry into execution the powers conferred upon it.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 22, at 2375 (“The courts, by contrast, have ignored the 
President’s role in administration action in defining the scope of the Chevron doctrine. . . . Courts 
grant (or decline to grant) step-two deference to administrative interpretations of law irrespective 
whether the President potentially could, or actually did, direct or otherwise participate in their 
promulgation.”); Strauss, supra note 198, at 703 (arguing that the President does not have a non-
statutory power over how executive officials who have been statutorily delegated authority 
implement laws). 
 208. Stack, Statutory President, supra note 1, at 539, 591 (“Of course, the Court in Chevron 
also justified deference in virtue of the administrative agency’s ‘greater expertise’ in the field of 
regulation. It might be objected that a generalist [P]resident does not have the same expertise as 
an agency. . . . Nothing prevents a president from requiring the work of members of an agency in 
drafting a detailed executive order. As a result, even if we concede that the [P]resident may have 
less expertise than an agency—although how much is not clear—that deficit does not unseat the 
strong grounds for applying Chevron to presidential orders based on the [P]resident’s heightened 
accountability, visibility, and ability to coordinate policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 209. Stack, Constitutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 210. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 211. David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 
82 (2009). 
 212. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
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States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.213 on arbitrary and 
capricious review of agency action provide yet one example.214 
Determining the appropriate amount of deference for the Statutory 
National Security President is even more complicated. For instance, 
courts may find it difficult to isolate out the appropriate deference to 
provide to the Statutory National Security President given the perpetual 
backdrop of constitutional national security powers.   
Additionally, without a clear standard that courts can apply to 
presidential interpretations of a statute, the resulting jurisprudence is too 
arbitrary. The haphazard way that courts approach the President’s use of 
statutory national security authority fails to provide a predictable 
approach for future presidential actions based on statutory authority. The 
randomness in judicial approaches therefore provide limited 
predictability for presidents and the public. 
Furthermore, given the historic deference to the President on national 
security issues, there is little disciplining of presidential decision-
making.215 If a president knows that she can survive judicial review with 
scant evidence, if any, of a national security threat, the merits of having 
external constraints in the first place become moot. Deference also 
involves back-end analysis, challenging the President’s decision-making 
long after it has occurred and the consequences of the action have already 
been realized. The efficacy of external constraints is further reduced by 
the President’s ability to claim confidentiality on the basis of national 
security actions, further neutering the judiciary’s ability to effectively 
review the presidential action. This lack of transparency has obvious 
implications for reduced accountability. 
Lastly, the focus on deference necessarily places analytical emphasis 
on the powers of the judiciary to check a president relying on statutory 
power when Congress has an important role to play in checking these 
statutory powers. Perhaps even more so in the case of national security 
matters, neither the judiciary nor Congress is sufficiently strong enough 
to temper actions of the Executive. More than ever, the two branches need 
to work together to provide a workable approach to judicial review. 
In short, this approach fails to provide a satisfying balance between a 
president’s need for nimble decision-making in national security 
emergencies and the public’s need for accountability and transparency of 
the President invoking such considerable powers. This inner turmoil 
concerning deference suggests it may be time for a fresh approach to 
limits on presidential statutory power. Specifically, the next Part changes 
the focus from deference to constraints, exploring whether consideration 
                                                                                                                     
 213. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 214. See, e.g., David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 143 (2010). 
 215. Robert F. Turner, The Constitutional Foundation for Fact Deference in National 
Security Cases, 95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 87, 95 (2009). 
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of constraints can provide a more systematic check on the Statutory 
National Security President.  
III.  RECONSIDERING PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS 
As the previous Part demonstrates, debating deference will only get 
us so far. Because of the shortcomings of judicial review described in Part 
II, this Part urges an alternative and more effective means of disciplining 
presidents acting under their statutory national security authority. It 
argues against the conventional wisdom that focuses solely on the degree 
of deference courts should afford the President through statutory 
interpretation. Instead, it urges a closer focus on the procedural 
constraints—and perhaps substantive, as well—that can be imposed on 
the President’s use of statutory national security power.  
Before one turns to statutory constraints, it is important to 
acknowledge one powerful form of constraint found in other parts of the 
Constitution: the protection of individual rights. As Professor Robert 
Turner has noted, “the modern reality is that the line between ‘national 
security’ and ‘individual rights’ is not always a clear one. Obviously, to 
the extent fundamental constitutional rights are at issue, the case for 
judicial deference to the Executive on national security issues 
weakens.”216 Despite assertions of national security, courts have 
repeatedly struck down presidential action in favor of protecting First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. For example, a court struck down 
the President’s attempts to suspend the entry of foreign nationals from 
seven Islamic countries as violating the First Amendment.217 “Although 
the Supreme Court has certainly encouraged deference in our review of 
immigration matters that implicate national security interests, it has not 
countenanced judicial abdication, especially where constitutional rights, 
values, and principles are at stake.”218  
                                                                                                                     
 216. Id. 
 217. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that although the President has power to deny entry to aliens, the President’s power is 
not absolute and does not allow disfavoring of one religion over another by issuing an executive 
order denying entry to aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 
353 (2017);  see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714–15 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring) (discussing the President’s attempts to censor newspapers) (“I believe that every 
moment’s continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, 
indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 
741, 755 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (deciding similarly to Int’l Refugee Assistance Project for 
a second, revised executive order), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
 218. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 587 (citation omitted). 
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Courts also have struck down the President’s attempts at warrantless 
wiretaps as violating the Fourth Amendment.219 And courts have rejected 
the President’s attempts to require a Chinese company to divest its 
interests in a wind farm in the name of national security as violating the 
Fifth Amendment.220 Notably, the Court imposed this constitutional 
constraint on the President despite a provision in the statute that precludes 
judicial review of “actions of the President.”221 
While not minimizing the value of these constitutional constraints, 
this Part instead focuses on non-constitutional procedural constraints as 
underappreciated sources of limits on the Statutory National Security 
President. Specifically, it urges Congress to consider whether imposing 
substantive and procedural constraints may be appropriate and desirable 
in a broader set of circumstances than currently exists. These constraints 
could come in the form of one comprehensive general statute or in 
individual statutes that delegate national security power to the President. 
Such a proposal would be consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence 
like Franklin v. Massachusetts, where the Court demanded “an express 
statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s 
performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of 
                                                                                                                     
 219. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (“Security surveillances are 
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, [and] the 
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering . . . . We recognize . . . the 
constitutional basis of the President’s domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in 
a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”); see also United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 
F. Supp. 29, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting executive action on national security wiretaps 
because it “would give the Executive a blank check to disregard the very heart and core of the 
Fourth Amendment and the vital privacy interests that it protects”); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“In this case, the President has 
acted, undisputedly, as [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)] forbids. FISA is the 
expressed statutory policy of our Congress. The presidential power, therefore, was exercised at 
its lowest ebb and cannot be sustained.”), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 220. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
The President relied on statutory authority in the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1) 
(Supp. III 2016), that authorizes a president “to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that 
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.” Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 311 
(quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1))). 
 221. Brief for Appellees at 27, Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d 296 (No. 13–5315) (“The sweeping 
language of the Defense Production Act encompasses the President's choice not to provide Ralls 
with more notice than it had already received, his decision not to confide in Ralls his national 
security concerns, and his judgment about the appropriate level of detail with which to publicly 
articulate his reasoning.”). The Court adopted a plain language interpretation of this provision, 
holding “that courts are barred from reviewing final ‘action[s]’ the President takes ‘to suspend or 
prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the United 
States,’” but not from reviewing “a constitutional claim challenging the process preceding such 
Presidential action.” Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. app 
§ 2170(d)(1)). 
 
39
Stein: A Statutory National Security President
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1222 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
 
discretion.”222 It would provide the congressional act with the “express 
statement” that was missing in the APA.223 
In addition to eliminating a default legislative approach that “exudes 
deference,”224 these constraints would also force more deliberative 
presidential decision-making, enhancing the accountability and 
transparency of the Executive. This Part identifies several such instances 
where Congress has imposed procedural constraints on the President’s 
statutory authority.225 It then proceeds to argue for a broader application 
of such constraints, exploring both the merits of process protections 
generally and the complications associated with such a proposal. 
A.  Merits of Process Protections 
“Procedure and law are inseparable.”226 Countless processes intersect 
nearly every facet of the legal system, including “processes for 
designating officials, for creating various forms of law,” and for 
enforcing and implementing the law.227 Due process is embedded in our 
Constitution and is often an essential means to a just result, but has 
inherent value in itself as a vehicle of fairness and transparency, assuring 
the presence of rationality in legal and political processes.228 The 
imposition of process requirements also serves to enhance the 
accountability of decision makers to those affected by such decisions 
through disclosure and public vetting.229 Some procedural requirements, 
such as those imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act, also 
                                                                                                                     
 222. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018). 
 225. Notably, for clarity’s sake, this excludes procedural constraints provided by the Fifth 
Amendment, categorizing those as constitutional constraints even though they do force particular 
procedures on the President. 
 226. Min Zhou, A Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Constitutional Procedure, 30 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 149, 155 (1998). 
 227.  Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process 
Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1974); see also Zhou, supra note 226, at 155–58 (discussing 
the relationship between procedure and law).  
 228. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”); see also Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating For Trust, 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 633, 641 (2018); see also Summers, supra note 227, at 20–27 (providing a 
catalogue of process values). 
 229. See Robert W. Adler, In Defense of NEPA: The Case of the Legacy Parkway, 26 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 297, 299–300 (2006); Ellen Hey, Increasing Accountability for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity: An Issue of Transnational Global Character, 
6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2, 4 (1995); Erin Ryan, Response to Heather Gerken’s 
Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1147, 1157, 1160 (2015); 
Summers, supra note 227, at 21–22. 
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promote sound decision-making by explicitly requiring extensive 
consideration of potential impacts of a proposed action.230  
Congress often imposes process requirements on decision makers as 
a prerequisite to releasing delegated power, requirements that can be 
divided into three categories. Sometimes Congress imposes significant 
procedural constraints on agencies, requiring consultations with 
Congress, justifications, reports, and shared implementation with other 
agencies.231 Sometimes Congress imposes moderate procedural 
constraints on agencies, requiring specific findings before the agency can 
act.232 And sometimes, Congress imposes minimal constraints that 
merely require the agency to provide notice before acting.233 Congress 
has even enacted the Congressional Review Act (CRA),234 which allows 
legislators to overturn executive regulations by joint resolution within 
sixty legislative days of publication.235 The narrowness of the 
circumstances where this would normally be activated236 precludes its 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Sharon Buccino, NEPA Under Assault: Congressional and Administrative Proposals 
Would Weaken Environmental Review and Public Participation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 50, 51 
(2003). 
 231. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1379(4) (2012) (requiring the Attorney General and the Secretary 
of State to consult with the Secretary of Treasury and report to Congress every two years 
describing the “implications of the technology standard” to confirm identity); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(2) (2012) (requiring every federal agency to consult with the Secretary of the Interior 
before taking any action to insure that their actions are “not likely to jeopardize . . . endangered 
species or threatened species”); 49 U.S.C. § 32902(i) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of 
Transportation to consult with the Secretary of Energy in prescribing regulations for average fuel 
economy standards). 
 232. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (requiring that the responsible official “include 
[an Environmental Impact Assessment] in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment”).  
 233. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1613(b) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Defense to notify 
Congress of any regulations made to carry out the Defense-Wide Intelligence Personnel Policy); 
20 U.S.C. § 6571(c)(1) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Education to provide a Senate and 
House committee notice of intent to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking fifteen business days 
prior to the notice). 
 234. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat 868 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 
(2012)).  
 235. 5 U.S.C. § 802.  
 236. Historically, the window occurs where there is a change in administration and Congress 
is unhappy with the prior administration’s regulatory efforts. See Steven Greenhouse, House Joins 
Senate in Repealing Rules on Workplace Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/us/house-joins-senate-in-repealing-rules-on-workplace-
injuries.html [https://perma.cc/DB3E-H72Y] for a description of Congress invoking this authority 
to overturn President Clinton’s ergonomic workplace regulations in 2001. See also Stephen 
Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional Review Act, WASH. TIMES 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-
15-obama-rules-using-congres/ [https://perma.cc/54GR-RA3P] (describing how Congress used 
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frequent use, but the Congressional Review Act reflects congressional 
intent to “check” the Executive Branch. 
The arguments in favor of process protections apply with similar force 
when applied to the President. A president performing obligations 
dictated by statute “occupies a position quite similar to that of any other 
administrative officer in that his legal sanction to carry out those 
responsibilities is derived solely from the enacted law.”237 Disciplining 
the fact finder, facilitating transparency, and providing accountability can 
enhance the legitimacy of both the Presidency and presidential decisions. 
President Obama appeared to understand the value of process constraints, 
grounding many of his decisions in statutory authority.238 These actions 
helped establish legitimacy and fend off some of the political attacks that 
President Bush had faced in connection with his presidential decisions on 
torture.239 In this way, operating under the statutory constraints became a 
source of political power. 
Similarly, some scholars have argued that the external checks that 
Congress and the judiciary were meant to provide on the President have 
eroded since 9/11.240 Professor Neal Katyal has argued that this 
weakening of government checks and balances is the result of a 
combination of factors, including judicial doctrines of deference that 
allow broad interpretation of statutes authorizing executive power in the 
area of foreign affairs, the inability of Congress to correct that 
interpretation because of the presidential veto and the need for a super-
majority override, and the entrenchment of the party system.241 Professor 
Dawn Johnsen also argues for more robust internal legal constraints on 
                                                                                                                     
the Congressional Review Act to roll back fourteen regulations). See generally Nina A. 
Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President 
Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003) (discussing Executive action taken before a new President 
takes office).  
 237. Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 522 (1987).  
 238. Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional 
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 86, 86–87 (2016). 
 239. Jessica M. Stricklin, The Most Dangerous Directive: The Rise of Presidential 
Memoranda in the Twenty-First Century as a Legislative Shortcut, 88 TUL. L. REV. 397, 405–06 
(2013); Peter M. Shane, The Presidential Statutory Stretch and the Rule of Law, 87 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1231, 1249–50 (2016). 
 240. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–20 (2006) (arguing Congress’s failure 
to affirm or deny the President’s actions after 9/11 led to the “demise of the congressional 
checking function”). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (explaining that the 
constant aim of our system of government “is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a 
manner as that each may be a check on the other”). 
 241. Katyal, supra note 240, at 2321.  
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executive power.242 She questions the adequacy of after-the-fact external 
review of questionable executive action or executive excesses and argues 
that “Presidents also must face effective internal constraints in the form 
of Executive Branch processes and advice aimed at ensuring the legality 
of the multitude of executive decisions.”243 She views legal advice from 
within the Executive Branch as an essential component of efforts to 
safeguard civil liberties.244 
In response, many scholars are engaged in discussions about the need 
for internal controls on the Executive Branch to counteract the weakening 
external controls.245 For some, like Katyal, these internal controls take 
the shape of agencies putting checks on other agencies.246 Katyal argues 
that bureaucracy is a critical mechanism to support internal constraints as 
it “creates a civil service not beholden to any particular administration 
and a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional worldview.”247 
Katyal suggests a variety of bureaucratic mechanisms to support internal 
separation of powers, including “overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory 
review of government action by different agencies, civil-service 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1601 (2007) (arguing that current internal legal 
constraint practices are insufficient and Congress, the courts, and the public should work together 
to empower Executive Branch legal advisors to constrain the President to his constitutional 
authority and obligations). 
 243. Id. at 1564. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See, e.g., Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 
461, 465 (2013) (arguing that the secret algorithms used in creating watch lists have little 
appreciable value in court, so internal regulation is necessary); Katyal, supra note 240, at 2318 
(proposing internal check designs that allow for “temporary departures when the need is great”); 
Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation 
of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 457 (2009) (calling for the reinforcing of internal Executive Branch 
constraints in addition to achieving separation of powers goals); Paul Ohm, Electronic 
Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269, 271 (2012) 
(arguing that intra-agency separation of powers, pitting the Justice Department against itself, 
would create competition for interpretations of the law); M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure 
Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal’s “Internal Separation of Powers,” 116 YALE L.J. FORUM 
(Nov. 3, 2006), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/can-process-cure-substance-a-response-
to-neal-katyala8217s-a8220internal-separation-of-powersa8221 [https://perma.cc/KDF9-VANT] 
(arguing that administrative controls were in place after September 11th, but the courses of action 
were taken despite the objections). 
 246. Katyal, supra note 240, at 2318; see also Bernstein, supra note 245 (“[W]e must look 
to institutional design and internal self-regulation to solve those problems that cannot reach the 
courts.”); Ohm, supra note 245 (proposing “intra-agency separations of powers” to create 
competition between agencies for statutory and constitutional interpretations). 
 247. Katyal, supra note 240, at 2317. 
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protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and 
an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.”248 
Professor Gillian Metzger, on the other hand, has noted that internal 
constraints, while preferable to no checks at all, can be of limited effect 
in checking aggrandized presidential authority.249 She argues for a 
broader focus on the interrelationship between internal and external 
constraints and reasons that internal checks reinforce, and are in turn 
supported by, external forces, “including not just Congress and the courts, 
but also state and foreign governments, international bodies, the media, 
and civil society organizations.”250 Dean Elizabeth Magill is similarly 
skeptical of the need for enhanced bureaucratic structure,251 and others 
have noted the practical limitations of requiring co-equal executive 
departments.252   
B.  A Spectrum of Procedural Constraints 
Despite the merits of procedural constraints, all too often scholars 
have acknowledged and dismissed procedural constraints on a president 
as ineffective.253 This Part urges a reconsideration of procedural 
constraints, not only for the actual power they currently wield, but for 
their potential power to provide more workable limits on the Statutory 
National Security President.254 It identifies a number of these procedural 
constraints and demonstrates how they work to temper unitary executive 
power over national security matters. 
Imposing additional constraints on the President is not a new concept. 
As Evan Criddle has noted, “[v]iewed from a republican perspective, the 
prospect of procedurally unfettered presidential lawmaking is deeply 
troubling.”255 Similarly, Professor Daniel Abebe has noted the 
importance of courts in limiting the President’s “ability to act 
                                                                                                                     
 248. Id. at 2318. 
 249. Metzger, supra note 245, at 425. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Magill, supra note 245 (arguing against a system that would air all possible views and 
promoting deeper consideration of disagreement among views). 
 252. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 245, at 270–71 (questioning its feasibility in the realm of 
electronic surveillance because law enforcement needs to have full control over the criminal 
investigations). 
 253. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 254. Instead of invalidating statutes along the lines of the non-delegation doctrine in A. L. A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935), this Section urges a reexamination of procedural constraints to enhance 
accountability. Kagan, supra note 22, at 2365–66 (“[A]wesome substantive breadth of [the] 
delegation [in Schechter Poultry], combined with its lack of procedural constraints and its 
effective subdelegation of authority to private parties, made it ripe for invalidation . . . .”). 
 255. Criddle, supra note 164, at 199. 
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independently or unilaterally.”256 As Professor Jack Goldsmith has noted, 
“if Congress does not want the President to act imperially, it should be 
more careful when it gives the President discretion to implement the laws 
it passes.”257 As Professor Harold Koh described, the 1970s resulted in a 
generation of statutes where Congress subjected “the President’s 
delegated foreign affairs powers to stringent procedural constraints,” 
such as “elaborate statutory procedures, including factual findings, public 
declarations, prior reporting, subsequent consultation requirements, and 
the legislative veto—the congressional control technique of choice in the 
post-Vietnam era.”258 Stack has also focused on contingent delegations 
where Congress granted the President power conditioned upon his 
determination that certain events have transpired.259 
Because courts have been reluctant to allow an abuse of discretion 
claim against a statutory President where the statute “contains no 
limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority,”260 it therefore 
follows that abuse of discretion claims have a chance of succeeding 
where Congress “places discernible limits on the President’s 
discretion,”261 including procedural constraints. The D.C. Circuit has 
supported this approach, because “[j]udicial review in such instances 
does not implicate separation of powers concerns to the same degree as 
where the statute did ‘not at all limit’ the discretion of the President.”262 
This Section identifies a number of such procedural constraints and 
                                                                                                                     
 256. Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 15–16 (2013). 
 257. Jordan A. Brunner, The (Cyber) New Normal: Dissecting President Obama’s Cyber 
National Emergency, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 397, 425 (2017) (citing Jack Goldsmith, Why Congress 
is Effectively Powerless to Stop the Iran Deal (and Why the Answer is Not the Iran Review 
Act), LAWFARE (July 20, 2015, 8:23 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-congress-
effectively-powerless-stop-iran-deal-and-why-answer-not-iran-review-act [https://perma.cc/28EA 
-8XPN].   
 258. Koh, supra note 19; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: 
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 4 (2006) (arguing for an “emergency 
constitution” framework statute that would limit a president’s emergency powers to an extremely 
short-term response that would lapse unless a majority of both houses voted to continue them, 
requiring reauthorization every two months by increasing supermajorities of Congress).  
 259. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 1, at 1174. 
 260. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 261. Id.; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (2001), as reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012) (authorizing the President “to use 
all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks); Reich, 74 F.3d at 1331 (noting no abuse of discretion claims against a president where 
the statute “contains no limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority”). 
 262. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 
(1994)). 
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organizes them into three categories: (1) significant, (2) moderate, and 
(3) minimal.  
1.  Significant Procedural Constraints 
Over the years, Congress has utilized a number of statutory provisions 
to impose significant procedural constraints on the President’s exercise 
of those delegated statutory powers. Constraints in this category require 
the President to make specific findings, as well as take some additional 
measures such as consultations, reports, or congressional approval. In 
1977, Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA)263 to limit executive abuses of the national emergency 
powers conferred on the President sixty years earlier by the Trading with 
the Enemy Act (TWEA).264 Under the IEEPA, the President was required 
to find an “unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to 
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if 
the President declares a national emergency with respect to such 
threat.”265  
But Congress went further, imposing substantive limits on the 
President, requiring the President to “consult” with Congress before 
using these powers,266 specifying under what authority the President is 
declaring a national emergency,267 and requiring the President to submit 
reports to Congress every six months.268 Harold Koh has noted how 
Congress differentiated the constraints on a president depending on 
whether it was wartime or nonwartime.269 Nonwartime activities required 
significant additional procedural constraints, conditioning the President’s 
                                                                                                                     
 263. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
06 (2012)). 
 264. Pub. L. No. 65-90, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1984). 
 265. 50 U.S.C. § 1701; see also United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 
2011) (discussing the requirements for activating IEEPA). 
 266. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (“The President, in every possible instance, shall consult with the 
Congress before exercising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult 
regularly with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.”). 
 267. Id. § 1703(b) (“Whenever the President exercises any of the authorities granted by this 
chapter, he shall immediately transmit to the Congress a report specifying— . . . (3) the authorities 
to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those 
circumstances . . . .”). 
 268. Id. § 1703(c) (“At least once during each succeeding six-month period after transmitting 
a report pursuant to subsection (b) of this section . . . the President shall report to the Congress 
with respect to the actions taken, since the last such report, in the exercise of such authorities, and 
with respect to any changes which have occurred . . . .”). 
 269. Koh, supra note 19, at 1264. 
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exercise of emergency powers upon prior congressional consultation, 
subsequent review, and legislative veto termination provisions.270 
Similarly, where the President determines the existence of a “critical 
shortage of any raw material, commodity, or product which jeopardizes 
the health or safety of the people of the United States or 
its national security or welfare” with no end in sight or hope to resolve 
the shortage without governmental intervention, the President can 
propose conservation measures and submit them to Congress.271 
Importantly, Congress prevents unilateral action by requiring the 
President to make a submission to Congress that triggers both hearings 
and legislative action, as well as a number of procedural findings. 
Specifically, the President must include a justification of the 
circumstances that require the conservation measures, a detailed 
procedure and budget, the degree of curtailment required, and “[a] 
complete record of the factual evidence upon which his recommendations 
are based, including all information provided by any agency of the 
Federal Government which may have been made available to him in the 
course of his consideration of the matter.”272 
Apparently realizing that it had failed to initially impose sufficient 
constraints on the President with respect to sanctions, Congress recently 
amended the sanction programs related to Iran, North Korea, and Russia 
by imposing new sanctions on these countries, as well as additional 
procedural constraints on the President’s use of statutory national security 
powers. In July of 2017, Congress passed the Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA),273 severely limiting the 
President’s use of the sanction powers with respect to the Russian 
Federation. Specifically, Congress now requires the President to “submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that 
describes the proposed action [related to sanctions] and the reasons for 
that action.”274 Congress goes farther, specifying details that must be 
included in the report.275 Importantly, Congress prohibits the President 
from acting during the thirty to sixty days while Congress is reviewing 
the report,276 and bars the President from taking such action should both 
Houses of Congress pass a joint resolution of disapproval.277 Such strong 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Id. 
 271. 15 U.S.C. § 713d-1(a) (Supp. III 2016). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 (2017) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). 
 274. 22 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(1) (Supp. V 2018). 
 275. Id. § 9511(a)(3)–(4). 
 276. Id. § 9511(b)(1)–(3) (“[T]he President may not take that action unless a joint resolution 
of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).”). 
 277. Id. § 9511(b)(6) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of 
disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described 
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procedural constraints reflect a critical balance between expediency, 
accountability, and the separation of powers generally. Reportedly, some 
in Congress hope to use this as a model to amend other statutes that 
provide the President with sanction powers.278   
Another strong form of presidential constraint comes in the form of 
shared implementation of a statute. Many statutes share authority 
between the President and the executive agencies. For instance, although 
the Federal Power Act279 provides the President with the statutory 
authority to identify a “grid security emergency,” the statute then 
provides the Secretary of Energy with the discretion to act on this 
emergency, noting he “may . . . issue such orders for emergency measures 
as are necessary in the judgment of the Secretary to protect or restore the 
reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric 
infrastructure during such emergency.”280 Importantly, Congress also 
requires the President to make a specific finding, providing a “written 
directive or determination identifying a grid security emergency.”281 
Congress further limited the Secretary’s issuance of such orders by 
requiring consultation with a number of entities, including Canada and 
Mexico.282 In theory, such procedural limitations on the Secretary extend 
to the President, since the President’s identification of a grid security 
emergency is moot without the Energy Secretary’s orders to address it. 
But in practice, many scholars have suggested the executive agencies are 
mere pawns of the President,283 which would suggest consolidated power 
despite an apparent statutory constraint. 
                                                                                                                     
in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that 
action.”). 
 278. Emily Cadei, Russian Sanctions: Congress Attempts to Reassert Power Over White 
House, NEWSWEEK (June 14, 2017, 6:21 P.M.), https://www.newsweek.com/congress-power-
russia-sanctions-trump-625832 [https://perma.cc/SG9E-QUBD] (reporting that Senator Crapo 
stated “[w]e intend to use this review model on all sanctions regimes moving forward, and I intend 
to work to apply it to Iran”). 
 279. Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
16 U.S.C.). 
 280. 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(b)(1) (Supp. V. 2018). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. § 824o-1(b)(3). 
 283. Akhil Reed Amar, The President, the Cabinet, and Independent Agencies, 5 U. ST. 
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36, 50 (2010) (discussing how the President has a broad set of powers 
over so-called independent agencies, and that “this casual label of independent agency shouldn't 
blind us to the key point that these officials, quote-unquote, independent, falls wholly within the 
executive branch, albeit with varied rules of composition authority and removal”); Anderson P. 
Heston, The Flip Side of Removal: Bringing Appointment into the Removal Conversation, 68 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95–96 (2012) (“[T]he President possesses powerful tools to bring 
his influence to bear on the independent agencies, such that uncooperative officials attempting to 
implement policies other than the President's preferred ones will find themselves swimming 
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Similarly, in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA),284 Congress 
provided the President with statutory authority to adjust the flow of 
imports of a commodity upon his conclusion that the commodity is being 
imported in such quantities or under such circumstances “to threaten to 
impair the national security of the United States.”285 Before the President 
may take such action, “the Secretary of Commerce . . . shall immediately 
initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the 
national security of imports of the article” and submit a recommendation 
to the President, who then decides whether to adjust the imports.286  
Section 1862 of the TEA fails to define the phrase “threaten to impair the 
national security” of the United States, thereby granting the President 
broad discretion to restrict or bar imports if he determines that the imports 
threaten national security.287 In an amendment to the TEA, however, the 
House Ways and Means Committee offered some guidance to the 
President in determining whether imports were threatening to impair 
national security.288 Section 1862 now lists relevant factors for the 
President and Secretary to consider in making a determination as to 
whether or not to take action.289 Actions taken by the President under the 
                                                                                                                     
upstream. Resignation (and a subsequent private sector position) may seem a more appealing 
alternative than doing battle with the President of the United States.”). 
 284. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 
U.S.C.). 
 285. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (2012). 
 286. Id. § 1862(b). 
 287. See id. § 1862. Proposed Amendment to the Global Trade Accountability Act of 2017 
would provide Congressional review of the imposition of duties and other trade measures by the 
Executive Branch: “Safeguarding national security. Section 232(c)(1)(B) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)(B)) is amended by inserting ‘subject to approval under section 
155 of the Trade Act of 1974,’ after ‘shall’.” S. 177, 115th Cong. § 155(c)(8) (2017).  
 288. See Nance & Wasserman, supra note 68, at 928–29 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1761, at 13–
15 (1958)). The statute was first entered into law as the Trade Expansion Act of 1954. Id. at 928. 
 289. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (“[T]he Secretary and the President shall, in light of the 
requirements of national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give consideration 
to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, the capacity of 
domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the human 
resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national 
defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including 
the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the 
importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect 
such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national security requirements. In 
the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close 
relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into 
consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills 
or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products 
by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors . . . .”).  
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TEA have been challenged on numerous grounds, but the courts seem to 
be appeased where Congress has provided additional guidelines to assist 
in the decision-making process.290   
2.  Moderate Procedural Constraints 
Congress has also imposed a category of more moderate procedural 
constraints—those that only require the President to make specific 
findings before acting on the power. For example, Congress amended the 
Defense Production Act of 1950291 with the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).292 Section 6 granted the 
President broad authority to suspend or prohibit a foreign investment if 
the President finds that the investment threatens to impair 
the national security of the United States.293 Congress conditions this 
power on specific findings on the part of the President.294 The President 
must first find (1) “there is credible evidence that leads the President to 
believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that 
threatens to impair the national security;” and (2) other laws would be 
inadequate “for the President to protect the national security in the matter 
before the President.”295 The statute provides the President with some 
guidance as to what constitutes a threat which could “impair national 
security,” as discussed supra at Section II.A.296  
                                                                                                                     
 290. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 569–70 (1976) (“[T]he 
broad ‘national interest’ language of the proposal, together with its lack of any standards for 
implementing that language, stands in stark contrast with . . . § 232(c)’s articulation of standards 
to guide the invocation of the President’s powers under § 232(b). In light of these clear differences 
between the rejected proposal and § 232(b), we decline to infer . . . that Congress felt that the 
President had no power to impose monetary exactions under § 232(b).”); Consumers Union of 
U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The President is not bound in any 
way to refrain from taking such steps if he later deems them to be in the national interest, or if 
consultation proves unavailing to meet unforeseen difficulties . . . .”); Massachusetts v. Simon, 
Nos. 75-0192, 75-0130, 1975 WL 3636, at *3 (D.D.C. 1975) (“Furthermore, Section 232 provides 
certain standards, even though general and somewhat imprecise.”).   
 291. Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.). 
 292. Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (Supp. III 
2016)). 
 293. Id. § 6 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)). 
 294. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(4). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. § 4565(a). This power has been exercised three times by presidents to block 
investments, such as a divesture of United States aerospace manufacturer, MAMCO, by Chinese 
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, a divesture of wind farm companies 
from Ralls, a Chinese company, and the purchase of Aixtron. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign 
Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Proclamation No. 3195, 55 Fed. Reg. 3935 
(Feb. 1, 1990); Proclamation No. 9550, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,607 (Dec. 7, 2016). 
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In yet another example of moderate constraints, where the President 
wants to transfer expensive military defense equipment, the President 
must issue a certification that justifies the use of the statutory emergency 
authority.297 Such certification normally becomes effective thirty days 
after consent, but the President can require that consent be effective 
immediately where the President states in the certification that “an 
emergency exists.”298 Importantly, Congress imposed constraints on the 
President’s exercise of this power, requiring that “the President shall set 
forth in the certification a detailed justification for his determination, 
including a description of the emergency circumstances which 
necessitate immediate consent to the transfer and a discussion of 
the national security interests involved.”299 
3.  Minimal Procedural Constraints 
Lastly, Congress has imposed a number of minimal procedural 
constraints on statutory Presidents, merely requiring the President to 
provide notice to Congress prior to exercising national security power. 
For instance, to waive the application of sanctions imposed on other 
countries in relation to the control of chemical and biological weapons 
where such waiver is “essential to the national security interests of the 
United States,” the President need only notify congressional committees 
fifteen days before the waiver takes effect to exercise this power.300 
Similarly, the President is authorized to waive the prohibition on using 
journalists as agents to collect intelligence information with a mere 
“written determination that the waiver is necessary to address the 
overriding national security interest of the United States” and notification 
to the relevant congressional committees.301 
In some statutes, the President need only notify congressional 
committees after acting upon the statutory authority, failing to provide 
any procedural constraint, but arguably providing some accountability. 
For instance, under the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1995302 the President may waive the requirements related to the sharing 
of classified information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation where 
“essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital national 
                                                                                                                     
 297. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(d)(1) (2012). 
 298. Id. § 2753(d)(2)(A), (C); see also id. § 2776(d)(2)(B) (similarly requiring thirty days, 
“unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists”).  
 299. Id. § 2753(d)(2)(C). 
 300. Id. § 5605(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 301. 50 U.S.C. § 3324(b) (Supp. II 2015).  
 302. Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.). 
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security interests of the United States.”303 The statute requires that 
“[s]uch waiver shall be in writing and shall fully state the justification for 
such waiver” and be provided to the relevant congressional committees 
within thirty days of issuance of the waiver.304 These provisions do raise 
questions concerning the number of statutory provisions in existence that 
impose no procedural constraints, rendering some statutory executive 
actions regarding national security virtually invisible. 
C.  Constraint Complications 
Any proposal to impose additional limits on the President acting in 
the name of national security is sure to generate controversy. Far from a 
perfect solution, this proposal does not minimize its complications. First, 
on a theoretical level, there are many who will be adamantly opposed to 
any further limitations on the President acting in the name of national 
security. Second, on a practical level, the difficulties of isolating 
constitutional from statutory authority may allow the President to evade 
any statutory procedural constraints by relying solely on the Constitution. 
Lastly, the effectiveness of any procedural constraints will depend on 
their judicial enforcement against the President. Each of these is 
discussed below. 
1.  Limiting Executive Power 
Staunch unitary executive supporters are likely to argue that 
additional procedural constraints usurp critical presidential discretion to 
determine whether a national security emergency exists.305 They are 
unlikely to be swayed by the enhanced accountability and transparency 
that can be gained with these additional constraints if it means that the 
commander in chief is in any way limited in her ability to respond swiftly 
and effectively to national threats.306 This is particularly true where it is 
difficult to demonstrate that these procedural constraints will improve 
outcomes.   
But we know that while there are costs from the agent’s 
errors, there are also costs from restricting the agent’s 
capacity to act. If we begin with the assumption that 
                                                                                                                     
 303. 50 U.S.C. § 3381(d)(5). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1762 (2009) 
(“[O]ne could reasonably envisage a unitarian argument against such limitations on the basis that 
presidential discretion to implement statutes is full and final and may not be made subject to 
judicial second-guessing or procedural constraints.”). 
 306. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Energy in the executive is a leading 
character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community 
against foreign attacks . . . .”). 
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the President is most competent in foreign affairs, or at least 
has a resource advantage and institutional expertise, we 
would need some confidence that oversight would improve 
outcomes, namely that foreign affairs decisionmaking would 
be improved by additional review. If such review has no 
effect on the agent’s compliance but constrains the agent 
from achieving the principal’s goals, the costs of oversight 
outweigh the benefits.307 
While these are legitimate concerns when evaluating presidential 
actions that stem solely from constitutional authority, these concerns are 
less troubling when evaluating statutory national security authority. This 
is because these powers are delegated to the President by the Legislative 
Branch and the President always has constitutional national security 
powers latent in the background should an exigent need arise that is 
inconsistent with a statutory procedural constraint.308 This makes them 
more amenable to limitation, as Congress has demonstrated through a 
number of statutory constraints on the President’s national security 
powers.309 
Furthermore, Congress has acknowledged the shared responsibility 
over national security that requires “joint efforts and mutual respect by 
Congress and the President.”310 In findings made regarding the 1998 
amendments to the Inspector General Act of 1978,311 Congress went as 
far as to note that  
Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is 
empowered by the Constitution to serve as a check on the 
executive branch; in that capacity, it has a ‘need to know’ of 
                                                                                                                     
 307. Abebe, supra note 256, at 14. Others may question whether the three categories should 
be adjusted, not ranked on whether the procedural constraint itself is minimal, moderate, or 
significant, but whether the effect of the procedural constraint is such. Notice, for instance, may 
not always have minimal effects on the proposed action. The administrative difficulties of 
applying procedural constraints based on the effects may be prohibitive, however, as the effects 
may be too particularized and not apparent until after the constraint has been implemented. Should 
Congress eventually be able to identify a pattern that emerges, the effects should definitely be 
taken into account and the constraints imposed can be adjusted. 
 308. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Deference and 
Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 460 (2004) (citing Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he President’s constitutional powers, in addition to the powers 
delegated to him by Congress, compel[] the judiciary to afford the Executive wide deference with 
regard to its wartime factual assertions.”). 
 309. See supra Section III.A.  
 310. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 
§ 701(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2413, 2413, as reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 32 (2000). 
 311. Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat 1101 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–13 (Supp. 
V 2018)). 
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allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch, 
including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence 
Community . . . .312  
The Supreme Court also has held in Ziglar v. Abbasi313 that “national 
security policy . . . is the prerogative of the Congress and the President,”314 
and others have noted the Court’s “insistence on meaningful dual-branch 
solutions to national security.”315  
One cannot deny that both the Legislative and Judicial Branches have 
imposed constraints on presidents and their use of statutory national 
security powers at different points in time.316 These constraints have not 
been deemed to be unwarranted intrusions on a president’s authority, but 
important components of the delicate system of checks and balances. 
Importantly, and perhaps most comforting to those who are skeptical of 
procedural constraints on statutory power, under this framework, the 
President still retain full presidential discretion when acting under his 
constitutional Article II powers.  
2.  Conflating Constitutional and Statutory Authority 
Even if one accepts the argument that Congress is capable of imposing 
such procedural constraints, parsing out constitutional and statutory 
national security authority is difficult.317 While courts have found a 
                                                                                                                     
 312. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 § 701(b)(3), as 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 32. 
 313. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 314. Id. (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 315. Landau, supra note 27, at 1977. 
 316. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, 
J., concurring) (“I conclude that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with 
the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the 
crisis . . . . I cannot sustain the seizure in question because here, as in Little v. Barreme, Congress 
had prescribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency at hand.”); see 
also Jason Luong, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2000) (“Although it fails to provide 
substantive limits on presidential action, the IEEPA does restrict the [P]resident’s power with 
several procedural constraints.”). 
 317. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 1 note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987) (“In foreign affairs, however, the President is clearly a separate source of law . . . . He 
perhaps has other law-making authority, although its scope is not agreed, and at least some of it 
may be subject to control by Congress.”); Koh, supra note 19, at 1263 (“The vast majority of the 
foreign affairs powers the President exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but 
rather, authorities that Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated to him by statute. Yet closer 
examination of the foreign affairs areas in which Congress has extensively legislated reveals a 
pattern of executive ascendancy in statutory realms even more striking than the President’s 
continued domination of the constitutional realms of warmaking and treaty affairs.”); Jonathan 
Turley, Through A Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory Interpretation, 53 
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president to have constitutional powers that exist independently of 
statutory powers,318 the converse is not true. Statutory authority for the 
President to act on a national security threat never exists in isolation. The 
President’s constitutional war powers authority is always lurking in the 
background, even absent congressional authorization.319 But if all agree 
that the President’s national security powers derived from the 
Constitution are broader than those conferred by statute, and procedural 
constraints only apply to the President’s exercise of statutory power, what 
would prevent the President from trying to evade the procedural 
constraints by claiming only constitutional powers? 
Courts are typically reluctant to narrowly construe national security 
statutes that authorize executive action because courts hesitate to define 
the scope of the President’s Article II powers in national security absent 
additional congressional authorization.320 In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the 
court considered whether the international law-of-war principles had a 
role in the interpretation of the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF).321 The court stated that if the President’s congressionally 
delegated authority granted under the AUMF was determined to be 
limited by international law, the President would not be subject to 
judicially enforced limits because of his independent authority under 
Article II.322 The court stated that “Article II constitutes an alternative 
source of authority.”323 Under the President’s Article II authority, the 
                                                                                                                     
SMU L. REV. 205, 207 (2000) (“The isolation of national security cases from traditional statutory 
interpretation critiques is evident in judicial decisions.”). 
 318. See, e.g., Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (holding that the authority of the President “to classify 
and control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give 
that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of 
power in the President [to serve as Commander in Chief] and exists apart from any explicit 
congressional grant”). 
 319. E.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In 1995, President Clinton deployed troops to Bosnia without 
congressional authorization, citing only his independent Article II authority . . . . President Clinton 
again acted without congressional authorization when he ordered air strikes in 
Kosovo . . . . Similarly, President George W. Bush invoked only his Article II authority when he 
deployed U.S military forces to Haiti without congressional authorization in 2004.”).  
 320. See, e.g., Sunstein, Administrative Law, supra note 199, at 2671 (“[S]tatutory 
enactments involving core executive authority should be construed . . . so as to avoid the 
constitutional difficulties that a narrow construction would introduce.”).  
 321. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 48 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion)).  
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Executive “possesses significant authority to act without congressional 
authorization in the national security and foreign policy realms.”324 
In Cole v. Young, the Supreme Court again stated that an executive 
order which was “to authorize dismissal of executive employees whose 
further employment [the President] believe[d] to be inconsistent with 
national security” should not be struck down if doing so would raise a 
question as to the constitutional power of the President.325 While the 
power did not arise from a direct statutory authorization from Congress, 
Article II may still provide the President with the authority to exercise 
this power.326  
The Youngstown approach provides a counter to the concern that a 
president could avoid procedural constraints by relying solely on 
constitutional powers.327 Despite the broader constitutional national 
security power, courts have been more inclined to uphold executive 
power where the President is acting under “the express or implied will of 
Congress.”328 And under Justice Jackson’s third category, a president will 
have a difficult time claiming he is acting under his constitutional powers 
if that exercise is in direct conflict with a statutory provision. Courts are 
typically less willing to defer to the President’s interpretation of a statute 
where the interpretation is seemingly inconsistent with the statute. For 
example, in Miller v. Youakim,329 the Supreme Court stated that the 
“construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be 
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.”330 In 
Levy v. Urbach,331 the Ninth Circuit would only overturn an executive 
action if it was “plainly inconsistent with the statute.”332 Similarly, in 
United States v. Wilson,333 the court ruled that “when the President’s 
narrowing construction of a statute does not contradict the express 
language of the statute, it is entitled to some deference, and [the court] 
will not normally disturb that construction.”334 Therefore, Congress has 
the opportunity to try to prevent at least some unwanted presidential 
action by passing laws in direct contradiction. 
                                                                                                                     
 324. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 50 n.28 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
banc).  
 325. 351 U.S. 536 at 568–69 (1956).  
 326. Id.  
 327. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., 
concurring). 
 328. Id. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 329. 440 U.S. 125 (1979). 
 330. Id. at 145 n.25 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).  
 331. 651 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1981).  
 332. Id. at 1283.  
 333. 76 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 2017).   
 334. Id. at 6.  
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3.  Judicial Enforcement of Constraints 
Even if one accepts the argument that constraints are an essential 
element in the balance of powers between the three branches, there 
remains the problem of limited judicial enforcement against the 
President.335 Whether that hesitation to hold the President to task when 
she invokes statutory national security powers stems from remnants of the 
political question doctrine or whether it is a historical reluctance to 
interfere in issues of national security, plaintiffs injured by the President’s 
exercise of statutory national security powers must still demonstrate 
standing and the courts must find the issue to be justiciable.336 Others, 
however, argue for the important structural role that the Judiciary plays in 
constraining the Executive.337 
As one example of a failed judicial constraint, Harold Koh has 
masterfully documented the interplay between the TWEA and the IEEPA, 
describing how courts have watered down the IEEPA’s procedural 
limitations.338 As discussed earlier, he noted that although “TWEA had 
authorized the President to wield an enormous store of delegated power 
in both wartime and nonwartime situations, simply by declaring the 
existence of a national emergency,” Congress responded by narrowing 
“the President’s authority in nonwartime situations, conditioning his 
exercise of emergency powers upon prior congressional consultation, 
subsequent review, and legislative veto termination provisions.”339 Koh 
continues to note, however, how “three successive Supreme Court 
decisions quickly emasculated IEEPA’s various congressional control 
devices,” again reducing the procedural constraints to declarations of a 
national emergency.340 
                                                                                                                     
 335. See the interesting work of Silverstein and Hanley, supra note 93, at 1457, finding that 
that courts are more willing to uphold presidential actions where the President is enjoying high 
public opinion approval ratings. 
 336. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 337. Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 790 (“Delegation could be tolerated, but only because it was 
possible to maintain an offsetting power through judicial review. In this view, to the extent a 
doctrine of deference disables the courts from helping to maintain that system of ‘dynamic 
equilibrium,’ it impermissibly encroaches on the structural mandate of the judicial power.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 338. Supra Section III.B.1. 
 339. Koh, supra note 19, at 1264. 
 340. Id. at 1264–65 & n.37 (“Presidents rarely terminated TWEA national emergencies. See 
Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control 
Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1104 (1983) ([explaining that] while 
Congress was considering IEEPA’s enactment in 1977, President Roosevelt’s 1933 TWEA 
declaration of national banking emergency was still in force). Thus, ‘TWEA emergency authority 
operated as a one-way ratchet to enhance greatly the President's discretionary authority over 
foreign policy.’ Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 245 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).”); see also 
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Similarly, the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) provides an example of a 
long, iterative discourse between the three branches.341 The statute 
granted authority to the President to limit imports on national security 
grounds.342 The President tried to limit imports under this statute, but the 
court struck down that act as exceeding the scope of the authority granted 
by Congress.343 Congress stepped in to amend the act to provide explicit 
factors for the President to consider when determining whether there was 
a national security emergency, and the courts responded with more 
deference for the President.344 
Another example of questionable judicial enforcement can be found 
in the National Emergencies Act (NEA).345 Concerned about excessive 
presidential power during national emergencies, Congress passed the 
NEA in 1976 to provide a check on presidential power during national 
emergencies.346 As Jordan Brunner describes, 
                                                                                                                     
Brunner, supra note 257, at 407 (“[T]here have been virtually no substantive limits placed on a 
[P]resident acting in a national emergency as a result of the IEEPA’s passage.”). 
 341. See S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 135–36 (1987) (discussing § 232(b) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962). 
 342. See id. 
 343. Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 620–21 (D.D.C. 
1980). The court ruled that “TEA does not authorize the President to impose general controls on 
domestically produced goods either through a monetary mechanism or through a quantitative 
device.” Id. at 618. 
 344. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 548 (1976).  
Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 232(b) belies any suggestion 
that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to 
limit the President's authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar the President 
from imposing a license fee system like the one challenged here. To the contrary, 
the provision’s original enactment, and its subsequent re-enactment in 1958, 
1962, and 1974 in the face of repeated expressions from Members of Congress 
and the Executive Branch as to their broad understanding of its language, all lead 
to the conclusion that § 232(b) does in fact authorize the actions of the President 
challenged here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the 
contrary cannot stand. 
Id. at 570–71. 
 345. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 
1621, 1622, 1631, 1641, 1651 (2012)). 
346.   Id. § 1621(a) (“the President is authorized to declare such national emergency”), but § 
1601(a) was to provide for termination of the majority of national emergencies within two years 
of its passage. See also Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President: Applicability of 
the National Emergencies Act to Statutes That Do Not Expressly Require the President to Declare 
a National Emergency 1 (Aug. 24, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opinion/file/914396/download 
[https://perma.cc/X7C3-VLN6] (finding that the NEA’s “coverage is not limited to statutes 
that expressly require the President to declare a national emergency, but rather extends to any 
statute “conferring powers and authorities to be exercised during a national emergency,” unless 
Congress has exempted such a statute from the Act.”)  
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In the time leading up to the NEA’s passage, two large 
problems emerged: (1) “the forty-year emergency,” . . . and 
(2) “approximately 470 separate sections of the United 
States Code were found . . . to delegate to the President a 
vast range of powers embracing every aspect of American 
life.” The latter powers range from controlling production 
and regulating private capital to assigning military forces 
abroad and controlling all communication, transportation, 
and travel in areas the [P]resident designates. To manage 
these problems, Congress passed the NEA. The NEA sought 
to rein in presidential power by, among other things, 
terminating all open-ended states of national emergency in 
existence within two years after its passage. It also placed 
numerous reporting requirements on the [P]resident. The 
NEA applies to all national emergencies unless the statutory 
authority referenced is explicitly exempted from the NEA’s 
provisions.347   
“Presidents declared an additional thirty-eight national states of 
emergency between 1976 and mid-2004 under the National Emergencies 
Act, above and beyond any of the natural disaster declarations.”348 
Commentators have noted, however, how courts have failed to enforce 
any of these provisions.349  
Judicial enforcement may also be limited because there will be times 
when the President cannot explain fully a decision to act in the name of 
national security without disclosing sources or methods of intelligence-
gathering. For instance, the state secrets privilege allows the federal 
government to unconditionally withhold sensitive materials from 
                                                                                                                     
 347. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aaron S. Klieman, Preparing for the Hour of Need: 
The National Emergencies Act, 9 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 47, 54 (1979)). See generally S. REP. 
NO. 93-549, at 14 (1973), https://ia802500.us.archive.org/3/items/senate-report-93-549/senate-
report-93-549.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3QV-LXC4] (“[A] legislative formula needs to be 
devised . . . by which Congress can exercise effective oversight over . . .  actions . . . taken 
pursuant to a state of national emergency as well as providing a regular and consistent procedure 
for the termination of such grants of authority.”).  
 348. Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 843–44 (2006); As of 
2019, 31 emergencies remain active, many of which have been active for more than two years. 
Ryan Struyk, Trump’s Wall Would Be the 32nd Active National Emergency, (Jan. 10, 2019, 12:46 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/politics/trump-wall-active-national-emergency/index. 
html [ https://perma.cc/N6Y2-FKRU]. 
 349. “[D]uring the 40 years the law has been in place, Congress has not met even once, let 
alone every six months, to vote on whether to end” the national emergencies. See Elizabeth 
Goitein, What the President Could Do If He Declares a State of Emergency, (Jan./Feb. 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019//01/presidential-emergency-powers/ 
576418/ [https://perma.cc/75TK-BB3H]; See also, Koh supra note 19, at 1291 (“[T]he President 
has won because the federal courts have usually tolerated his acts, either by refusing to hear 
challenges to those acts, or by hearing those challenges and then affirming his authority on the 
merits.”). 
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evidentiary records in court cases.350 Furthermore, “[s]ince the enactment 
of the [Freedom of Information Act], courts have ruled on hundreds of 
cases involving classified information, affirming the government’s 
decision to withhold the requested information in nearly every case,”351 
many times on the grounds of national security. This is due to many 
reasons: “[f]ailure to maintain secrecy could injure a country when 
classified national security information is crucial to present day foreign-
policy decisions, place diplomacy at a relative disadvantage, involve 
active military operations, derive from covert sources who were either 
promised anonymity or remain active, or sire an unwarranted and 
undesirable public repercussion.”352 The President, and the government 
in general, has to strike a delicate balance between safety and 
transparency when it comes to information regarding matters of national 
security. While “[n]ational security secrecy prerogatives and executive 
privileges have permitted many administrations to veil highly 
controversial actions and misdeeds,”353 there are also many situations in 
which not disclosing national security secrets has helped protect the 
American people.354 At one point, Congress itself had even “gone so far 
as to impose an affirmative obligation on the Director of the CIA to 
protect intelligence sources.”355 Courts are not likely to be willing to 
second guess a president who alleges that she cannot disclose information 
that was critical to her decision because its disclosure would compromise 
sources and methods.  
There are a number of counterexamples, however, where courts have 
employed their powers of judicial review to overturn presidential 
exercises of statutory national security authority. The D.C. Circuit has 
                                                                                                                     
 350. Faaris Akremi, Does Justice “Need to Know”?: Judging Classified State Secrets in the 
Face of Executive Obstruction, 70 STAN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2018). 
 351. Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National 
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 67 (1992) 
(footnote omitted). 
 352. Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s 
Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 399, 402–03 (2012) (footnote omitted) (“White House 
Executive Orders designate what should be a classified secret, but the [P]resident has considerable 
interpretive latitude and the ultimate decision over what, how, and to what extent information 
should be classified or declassified is generally unreviewable.”). 
 353. Id. at 426. 
 354. See, e.g., Devin S. Schindler, Between Safety and Transparency: Prior Restraints, 
FOIA, and the Power of the Executive, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 12–13, 22 (2010) (discussing 
the battle between the ACLU and the Department of Defense over photographs, documentation, 
and other information regarding the torture of prisoners detained at Abu Ghraib prison, and 
arguing that “[t]he case . . .  highlights the dilemma faced by the Executive when confronted with 
a demand to release nonconfidential information the President and his agents legitimately believe 
will cause substantive, physical harm to Americans”). 
 355. Id. at 30; accord 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2006) (Savings Provisions). 
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rejected the President’s claim to have satisfied a procedural constraint 
where the President issued an executive order barring the federal 
government from contracting with employers who hire permanent 
replacements during a lawful strike: “We think it untenable to conclude 
that there are no judicially enforceable limitations on presidential actions, 
besides actions that run afoul of the Constitution or which contravene 
direct statutory prohibitions, so long as the President claims that he is 
acting pursuant to the Procurement Act in the pursuit of governmental 
savings.”356 A mere claim was not enough.  
Even where Congress has attempted to preclude judicial review of 
statutory national security power, courts have found a way to review such 
executive action. For instance, Congress included a provision in FINSA 
stating that certain actions of the President “shall not be subject to judicial 
review”;357 a finding that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Dalton.358 
The D.C. Circuit clarified that Dalton’s holding simply meant that “when 
a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the President and contains 
no limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority, judicial review 
of an abuse of discretion claim is not available.”359 With this clarification, 
the court proceeded to exercise judicial review in that case, where the 
President “independently violate[d] the NLRA, a statute that delegates no 
authority to the President to interfere with an employer’s right to hire 
permanent replacements during a lawful strike.”360 
Moreover, the presence of procedural constraints does nothing to 
minimize the Judiciary’s responsibility to review a Statutory National 
Security President. In Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States,361 the court affirmed its proper place in reviewing a 
president’s statutory national security actions, even where the statute 
otherwise provided for some congressional oversight of the President 
through an annual report the President was required to submit.362 The 
court said: “We hardly think that, by reserving to itself such limited 
review of presidential actions and critical technology assessments, the 
Congress intended to abrogate the courts’ traditional role of policing 
                                                                                                                     
 356. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 357. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 6, 121 
Stat. 246, 256 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (Supp. III 2016)) (“[t]he actions of the 
President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the findings of the President under paragraph 
(4) of subsection (d) shall not be subject to judicial review”). 
 358. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 473 (1994). 
 359. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1331. 
 360. Id. at 1332. 
 361. 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 362. Id. at 312. See supra note 220–21 for a discussion of the Defense Production Act. 
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governmental procedure for constitutional infirmity and perform that 
function itself.”363 
Most recently, in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. Hawaii,364 
she alleged that “the majority empowers the President to hide behind an 
administrative review process that the Government refuses to disclose to 
the public.”365 She analogized this case to Korematsu v. United States,366 
where “the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence 
agencies’ views of the alleged security concerns to the very citizens it 
purported to protect.”367 Although Korematsu involved constitutional, 
and not statutory authority, Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion that 
Justice Sotomayor cites is just as relevant here: “upholding the 
Government’s policy would prove to be ‘a far more subtle blow to liberty 
than the promulgation of the order itself,’ for although the executive order 
was not likely to be long lasting, the Court’s willingness to tolerate it 
would endure.”368 
IV.  CHANGING THE DEFAULT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT STATUTORY 
NATIONAL SECURITY POWER 
The last piece of the puzzle involves imposing a default set of 
procedural constraints on a president seeking to exercise statutory powers 
that are conditioned on a national security provision. This Part provides 
mechanisms to tailor such a proposal in a way to better effectuate the 
balance of powers over national security threats. It does not specify 
whether Congress should address existing grants of statutory national 
security authority, future grants of authority, or both. Should Congress 
decide to pass one comprehensive, retrospective law akin to the NEA, it 
need not apply to all statutory references to national security. Instead, 
Congress would be able to catalogue the numerous provisions containing 
these terms and separate them into two groups: those which use the terms 
as triggers of presidential power and those that simply use the terms as 
descriptors.369 Should Congress include model constraints in prospective 
                                                                                                                     
 363. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 312. 
 364. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 365. Id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 366. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 367. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 368. Id. at 2448 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245–46 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
 369. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3021 (Supp. IV 2017) (describing the function and membership 
of the National Security Council); 50 U.S.C.A. § 3314 (West 2018) (describing how to submit 
reports about national security systems to Congress); 50 U.S.C. § 3617 (Supp. IV 2017) 
(describing the establishment and duties of the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies 
Panel). The foregoing are the types of statutory provisions that would be excluded as mere 
descriptive references. Congress may also want to separate those statutes that have national 
security as their primary purpose from those where the national security provisions are merely 
 
62
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/2
2018] A STATUTORY NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENT 1245 
 
 
individual statutes, there may be less ambiguity about what form of 
constraints along the sliding scale is appropriate to that specific power. 
Those decisions are left to Congress. 
But this Part does urge Congress to consider constraints. The basic 
premise for these constraints is that a statutory president should earn the 
deference a court provides her by providing legitimate justifications for 
the exercise of such legislatively delegated power. This leads to at least 
two initial questions. First, what type of procedural constraint would be 
required of the President? Second, how would one narrowly tailor the 
constraints to provide both flexibility and accountability? This Section 
answers both. 
This Article is also the first to suggest a distinction to allow for a 
sliding scale of constraints that may be more workable than past efforts—
namely, whether the national security threat is acute or chronic. This 
approach carries its own challenges, but it may be more effective when 
considering the imposition of procedural constraints on the President. 
This is because a primary objection to imposing such constraints on the 
President with regards to national security is that it will hinder that 
president from making necessarily swift decisions. However, 
distinguishing acute from chronic threats can provide a procedural sliding 
scale that provides the President flexibility when it is needed (acute 
threats), but requires a greater showing when time and circumstances 
allow (chronic threats). In short, it sets forth suggestions for how to 
narrowly tailor these additional constraints in a way that best allows for 
both accountability and responsiveness to coexist. 
A.  Sliding Scale of Procedural Constraints 
The range of procedural constraints that could be imposed on a 
president acting under statutory national security powers is vast, as 
evidenced by those documented in Section III.A. Congress could also 
adopt procedural requirements from the APA; the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA);370 or a host of other statutes 
that require more mindful decision-making through some mixture of 
notice, reasoned decision-making, or the development of a written record. 
The default requirement, however, should be a presidential finding of a 
national security threat that entails more than a mere assertion or claim 
without any justification. Complying with such procedures allows a 
                                                                                                                     
incidental to the primary purposes of the statute. Congress also may be limited in this approach 
by the president’s veto authority. One possibility that eliminates this problem for future statutes 
is the use of sunset provisions. See generally, Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism 
Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (2013).  
 370. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.).  
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president to “earn” the deference he seeks from courts on such matters, 
but also suffers from temporal limits as any additional procedural hurdles 
will delay implementation.  
Requiring greater demonstration by the President of the actual 
security threat used to invoke statutory powers is not a new idea, as 
evidenced by support from a number of courts.371 In Stagg P.C. v. U.S. 
Department of State,372 for instance, the Second Circuit stated that the 
government could not simply invoke national security as a vague 
generality, but must set forth specific concerns to “technical data” as 
defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation.373 Similarly, one 
court has noted that it wants more than a mere assertion of national 
security:  
National security is too ambiguous and broad a term. The 
memory of lawlessness that masqueraded as ‘national 
security’ searches is too close to the memory of this 
court. . . . Without any qualification or explanation of what 
is meant by national security an investigation can be initiated 
on the assertions of an overzealous public official who 
disagrees with the unorthodox, yet constitutionally protected 
political views of a group or person.374  
Similarly, in Meshal v. Higgenbotham,375 the court required the 
Government to provide sufficient detail before making an assertion that 
national security was at risk: 
Before declining to recognize a cause of action because 
of national security concerns, the court should require the 
                                                                                                                     
 371. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526–33 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the 
government proposal that a president must show “some evidence” to support executive action 
from a congressional delegation and finding the President’s generalized finding about the viability 
of criminal trials was “insufficient”); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 551 (1956) (requiring specific 
evidence to show that the nation’s safety was imperiled). A similar justification has been imposed 
on executive agencies. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(holding that the defendants (FBI) could not dismiss a claim under § 2520 by simply stating that 
defendants were within a national security exemption without supported statements which would 
show that (1) surveillance was done for national security purposes and (2) the allegation of 
national security comported with the congressional purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)). But see 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (arguing on behalf of the government 
that the courts lack knowledge and techniques necessary to determine whether there was a 
probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security). 
 372. 673 F. App’x 93 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 373. Id. at 95–96 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, 
J., concurring)). The court added that considerable deference is accorded to the Executive in 
evaluating the facts. Id. at 96. 
 374. Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 782 (D.N.J. 1978).  
 375. 804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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government to provide a concrete, plausible, and 
authoritative explanation as to why the suit implicates 
national security concerns. That judges cannot “forecast” on 
our own whether or how this suit might affect national 
security only underscores why we must require that the 
government take responsibility for invoking any such 
rationale. If this case indeed raises national security 
concerns, our law provides the United States with the 
opportunity to advance them, and gives courts more nuanced 
and focused ways to address such concerns.376  
This approach parallels that of scholars such as Evan Criddle, who has 
advocated for a greater role for due process in presidential decision-
making. After recounting the nondelegation doctrine’s history, Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan,377 and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States,378 Criddle noted that “the Court took pains in both cases to 
emphasize the dearth of administrative procedure in the President’s 
decisionmaking process.”379 He explored the options for enhancing 
presidential accountability, including a rejection of Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, an extension of the APA to the President, and 
Congressional legislation providing a general framework for presidential 
administrative procedure.380 
Other courts have demonstrated their willingness to demand more of 
a president acting under statutory authority, even when such procedural 
constraints are only implied. Section 1182(f) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),381 for instance, provides express statutory 
authority without discernible limits.382 It states that:  
[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens 
or of any class of aliens into the United States would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by 
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem 
necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of 
aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the 
entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be 
appropriate.383 
                                                                                                                     
 376. Id. at 445 (citation omitted). 
 377. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) 
 378. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 379. Criddle, supra note 164, at 198–201. 
 380. Id.  
 381. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 382. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012).  
 383. Id.  
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Relying on this statutory national security authority, President Trump 
issued Executive Order 13,769, which included several provisions 
explicitly limiting the entry of refugees and aliens from seven countries 
into the United States.384 Although this provision did not contain an 
explicit reference to national security, the government defended the 
presidential action in the name of national security.385 
When challenged in two different jurisdictions, both courts 
acknowledged the constitutional constraints that limited such executive 
action, citing the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.386 The 
United States District Courts of Maryland and Hawaii, along with two 
appellate courts, disagreed with the President’s interpretation of the scope 
of executive authority under the INA.387 President Trump appealed 
International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump388 from the District 
Court of Maryland to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, which affirmed in part the district court’s issuance of the 
nationwide preliminary injunction against enforcement of Section 2(c).389 
The President subsequently issued a revised order, Executive Order 
13,780 to address these concerns, revoking Executive Order 13,769.390  
But perhaps more importantly for our purposes, both the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits implied procedural constraints on presidential action even 
where they were not explicit in the statute. This is a bold assertion of 
unitary judicial power. The Fourth Circuit stated that the Government 
was unable to show that national security was the primary purpose of 
implementing Section 2(c).391 The court acknowledged its duty to ensure 
that the President is choosing a constitutionally permissible means of 
                                                                                                                     
 384. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order 
No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 385. See id.; Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1235 (D. Haw.) (“According to the 
Government, the Court must afford the President deference in the national security context and 
should not ‘look behind the exercise of [the President’s] discretion’ taken ‘on the basis of a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gov’t Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for TRO at 42–43, Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (No. 17-0050 
DKW-KSC), ECF No. 145)), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
 386. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 586–87 (4th Cir.), 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
 387. See Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d. at 1237; see also Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d. at 554–56 (explaining that the INA does not provide the President a 
basis to act discriminatorily in an Executive Order).   
 388. 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
 389. Id. at 572. 
 390. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).  
 391. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 596. 
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exercising immigration power.392 The Fourth Circuit chastised the 
Government: 
The Government argues that we should simply defer to 
the executive and presume that the President’s actions are 
lawful so long as he utters the magic words “national 
security.” But our system of checks and balances established 
by the Framers makes clear that such unquestioning 
deference is not the way our democracy is to operate. 
Although the executive branch may have authority over 
national security affairs, it may only exercise that authority 
within the confines of the law . . . .393  
The Ninth Circuit similarly upheld a preliminary injunction issued by 
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to block 
enforcement of Section 2(c), finding that the President had exceeded his 
authority under 1182(f) of the INA, and stating that “[t]he actions 
taken . . . require the President first to make sufficient findings that the 
entry of nationals from the six designated countries and the entry of all 
refugees would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”394 
The court also found that the order did “not provide a rationale explaining 
why permitting entry of nationals from the six designated countries under 
current protocols would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States.”395 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the President did 
not satisfy the precondition to exercising his authority because the order 
did not offer any legally sufficient findings that the nationality of the 
barred individuals would render them a national security concern, 
warranting their restricted entry.396 The court added that “[n]ational 
security is not a ‘talismanic incantation’ that, once invoked, can support 
any and all exercise of executive power under § 1182(f).”397 These 
decisions reflect a broader willingness to hold statutory national security 
Presidents to a standard higher than the explicit statute, but these courts 
took a risk in so holding in the absence of explicit constraints in the text 
                                                                                                                     
 392. Id. at 593–94. 
 393. Id. at 632 (citation omitted). 
 394. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 776 (9th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
 395. Id. at 773. The court compared this to other Presidents that have invoked their authority 
under § 1182(f) by tying exclusion of classes of persons to culpable conduct of barred aliens. Id. 
at 772 n.13. 
 396. Id. at 776. 
 397. Id. at 774 (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1967)); see also Def. 
Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 476 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the government’s “vague invocation” of national security interests); Paton v. La Prade, 
469 F. Supp. 773, 781 (D.N.J. 1978) (“Thus the court dispels the myth that national security is an 
incantation with which the government can circumvent the Constitution or the law of the land.”). 
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of the statute. Specifically, they required a rationale and legally sufficient 
findings that the target of the presidential action was a national security 
concern. In other words, the courts unilaterally imposed procedural 
constraints. 
Before the second Executive Order expired, President Trump issued 
Proclamation No. 9645, seeking to improve vetting procedures for 
foreign nationals traveling to the United States by imposing a permanent 
restriction on travel.398 Plaintiffs challenged it in the Supreme Court as 
violating both a statute (Immigration and Nationality Act) and the 
Constitution (Establishment Clause).399 In June of 2018, the Supreme 
Court consolidated the cases and reversed both lower courts, upholding 
the President’s lawful exercise of “broad discretion granted to him” under 
the statute.400 The Court placed “the admission and exclusion of foreign 
nationals” squarely within the “fundamental sovereign attribute[s] 
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune 
from judicial control.”401 Despite these findings, the Court engaged in a 
review of the deference provided by the statutory terms, finding that 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States” is a statutory 
requirement that “exudes deference to the President.”402 This suggests 
that a Congressional grant of statutory authority that was not as broad 
may trigger greater scrutiny.  
Plaintiffs had asserted that the statute “requires the President to make 
a finding” that entry of these foreigners “would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States,” as well as “explain that finding with 
sufficient detail to enable judicial review.”403 The Court found this 
premise “questionable,” but proceeded to evaluate both whether (1) the 
findings are persuasive; and (2) whether the findings are sufficient. It 
proceeded, “assuming that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness 
of the President’s findings is appropriate.”404 But it rejected any attempt 
to attack the sufficiency, noting that “such a searching inquiry is 
inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally 
accorded the President in this sphere.”405 The Court made note of the 
“comprehensive evaluation” conducted by the agencies and the 
“extensive findings” issued with the Proclamation that assess the other 
                                                                                                                     
 398. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 399. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018). 
 400. Id. at 2400. 
 401. Id. at 2418 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
 402. Id. at 2408 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)). 
 403. Id. at 2409 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)). 
 404. Id. at 2400 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988)). 
 405. Id. at 2400–01 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187–88 (1993)). 
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countries’ deficiencies in their entry procedures.406 The Court noted that 
“the Government need provide only a statutory citation to explain a visa 
denial.”407 It also noted that “‘when it comes to collecting evidence and 
drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of 
competence on the part of the courts is marked.’”408 Faced with a facially 
broad statute, Plaintiffs were forced to focus on the statutory structure 
and legislative purpose, both of which were rejected by the Supreme 
Court in the face of what they perceived as the “clear text of the 
statute.”409 
Trump v. Hawaii stands as yet another reason for why Congress must 
speak with more clarity where such findings are required. In rejecting 
claims that the President failed to justify his use of statutory authority, 
the Court concurrently lays out a roadmap for Congress should it wish 
for a different result in the future. First, the Court distinguished the broad 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States” language here from 
narrower “national emergency” language.410 The Supreme Court 
recognized that “[w]hen Congress wishes to condition an exercise of 
executive authority on the President’s finding of an exigency or crisis, it 
knows how to say just that.”411 Second, the Court noted that the text of 
this statute “offers no standards that would enable courts to assess, for 
example, whether the situation in North Korea justifies entry restrictions 
while the terrorist threat in Yemen does not.”412 Faced with a facially 
broad statute, Plaintiffs were forced to focus on the statutory structure 
and legislative purpose, both of which were rejected by the Supreme 
Court in the face of what they perceived as the “clear text” of the 
statute.413 
While not a guarantee that a future Court would be able to see beyond 
the longstanding precedent that the President is the more appropriate 
branch than the courts to assess foreign security threats, a statute that used 
narrower language and provided standards by which courts can assess 
presidential actions might go a long way. A court may then be more 
willing to acknowledge that the more appropriate branch is not 
necessarily the President, but a political branch. Importantly, the 
politically appointed branches can include either the President, Congress, 
                                                                                                                     
 406. Id. at 2400. 
 407. Id. at 2419 (citing Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015)). 
 408. Id. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010)). 
 409. Id. at 2410. 
 410. Id. at 2412–13 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)). 
 411. Id. at 2413. 
 412. Id. at 2415. 
 413. Id. at 2410. 
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or both.414 Whereas courts may defer to the President over Congress for 
constitutionally authorized national security actions, courts may be more 
willing to defer to Congress over the President for statutorily authorized 
national security actions. 
Importantly, in his dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Breyer states 
that the statute does require that there be “find[ings]” that the grant of 
visas to foreigners “would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States.”415 The majority found the President’s findings to be sufficient, 
but the broad text of the statute again suggests that Congress could 
provide more requirements than merely directing a president to “find.” 
For instance, Congress could require Presidents to provide “sufficient” or 
“overwhelming” documentation to support the alleged national security 
interests, including specific threats. There are a number of ways for courts 
to handle such sensitive information,416 but the default should not be for 
courts to blindly decline to perform the analysis. As just one example, 
these findings could be confidential and released to the courts for in 
camera review.417 Without any type of review, there is nothing to provide 
a check on a rogue executive, a result that few would find palpable. 
Justice Sotomayor takes a much stronger position in her dissent, noting 
that the President’s policy “masquerades behind a façade of national-
security concerns”418 and is merely “window dressing” to the President’s 
discriminatory animus against Islam.419 She notes that “[d]eference is 
different from unquestioning acceptance.”420 In short, Congress is within 
its power to impose procedural constraints on a president, and where they 
have, courts can and should enforce them.  
B.  From Acute to Chronic Threats 
This last Section provides additional considerations for a Congress 
contemplating procedural constraints, namely how the level of procedural 
                                                                                                                     
 414. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“[R]elations with foreign 
powers . . . are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislative or the 
Executive . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 415. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)). 
 416. See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 119, at 108, 144 (arguing against “the exceptional 
procedures applied to national security secrecy”). 
 417. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012) (“In any judicial review of a determination made 
under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 
1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the 
reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to 
judicial review.”); “The legislature cannot act effectively if it is at the mercy of the executive for 
information.” See ACKERMAN, supra note 258, at 85. For a more thorough discussion of ways to 
maintain secrecy in national security litgation, see Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and 
National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018). 
 418. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 419. Id. at 2440. 
 420. Id. at 2441 n.6. 
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requirements could vary depending on the type of national security threat. 
Not all security threats are created equal, so it would be rational that the 
levels of procedural constraint are similarly varied. Despite the variety, 
the key to creating a workable system of constraints would be to ensure 
that similar levels of procedural constraints apply to similar threats. For 
this reason, this Section proposes a novel approach to categorizing 
national security threats as acute or chronic, with a corresponding sliding 
scale inverse to the exigency of the situation. In other words, for chronic 
national security threats, Congress might impose a basic demonstration 
that justifies the existence of an actual security threat, much like that 
discussed above. For those national security threats that the President 
deems to be more acute, the President can act liberated from procedural 
constraints.  
The first challenge to implementing such a proposal would be to 
define what is meant by acute and chronic threats. Acute threats could be 
those that are discrete, specific incidents capable of identification. An 
example of an acute threat would be a targeted attack on the transformers 
on the electric grid in California. Chronic threats could be generalized 
threats with indistinct beginnings and ends or those that are recognized 
as being perpetual. An example of a chronic threat would be 
cybersecurity. In 2015, President Obama used his statutory national 
security powers under the IEEPA to issue Executive Order 13,694 on 
cybersecurity.421 In essence, this Executive Order “created 
a permanent national emergency, given the ubiquity and continued 
escalation of cyberattacks”,422 providing a clear example of a chronic 
national security threat. But we encounter more difficulty with the threat 
created by the thirteen Russians indicted for meddling in elections.423 If 
the acts that threatened national security occurred close in time to the 
elections, those would surely be acute. But if they were part of the long 
game, with slow infiltration over many years, these acts may be more 
appropriately classified as chronic. In reality, many risks are both acute 
and chronic, and the President is likely to claim that every risk falls in 
both categories. 
                                                                                                                     
 421. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 422. Brunner, supra note 257, at 397. This conception of an acute national security concern 
comports with governmental interpretations of a national “emergency.” See CRS Report for 
Congress, National Emergency Powers at CRS-5 (Aug. 30, 2007), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/C77S-FPRA] (acknowledging the difficulties of definiting 
national emergencies and suggesting an emergency is “sudden, unforeseen, and of unknown 
duration”). Similarly, Congress rejected an amendment to the NEA that would have “limit[ed] its 
use to situations in which war has already been declared or the United States has been attacked, 
unless an emergency is specifically declared by joint resolution of Congress.” Lobel, supra note 
120, at 1429 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 276456 (Sept. 4, 1975)). 
 423. See Bertrand, supra note 90. 
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Those definitional problems lead to a second, related problem: who is 
to decide whether threats should be classified as acute or chronic? 
Although allowing the President to decide is as effective as the fox 
guarding the hen house, allowing the courts to decide is likely to cause 
more separation-of-powers concerns. As discussed earlier, attempts to 
make the distinction between foreign and domestic national security 
threats424 and war and nonwartime threats425 initially suggest that this 
distinction is bound for failure. Most of them have proved untenable and 
unworkable as the lines between the distinctions have become 
increasingly blurred. One way to make the distinction between acute and 
chronic a bit less fluid would be to tie it to the idea of a default 
presumption that all threats are chronic. In that way, the President 
alleging an acute national security threat must overcome this default 
presumption.426 It is the rare circumstance where the President needs to 
respond immediately, and where he does, he is likely to be able to justify 
that the action is acute or alternatively base his actions on constitutional 
war powers.   
A third problem lies in the transitory nature of national security 
threats. One need only look to the war in Afghanistan to see a threat that 
moved from acute to chronic.427 When such threats get “downgraded,” 
will a president need to perform a reassessment of the measures taken 
with adherence to the enhanced procedural constraints of a chronic 
threat?  
Although there is no indication that Congress has ever used this 
distinction between acute and chronic national security threats in a 
statute, in a few rare instances, Congress has conditioned the President’s 
use of national security power on the existence of an “imminent” national 
security threat, a term that may be comparable to the “acute” 
classification.428 Congress rarely provides more clarity on the term, but 
this example suggests that they are intending something other than 
“generalized” national security as it is understood in the majority of 
                                                                                                                     
 424. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 426. Opponents may argue that putting this burden on a president to overcome the default 
chronic presumption is just as burdensome as a procedural constraint, but in reality, it would not 
delay any action, but would merely be subject to judicial review after the action had occurred.  
 427. See generally Mujib Mashal, ‘Time for This War in Afghanistan to End,’ Says Departing 
U.S. Commander, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/world/ 
asia/afghan-commander-us-john-nicholson.html [https://perma.cc/D5JL-7JYY] (discussing the 
transition of the conflict in Afghanistan from an immediate threat to a persisting issue). 
 428. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2538(a), (c) (2012); 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(12) (2012); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717z(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 8511(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). But see 10 U.S.C. 
§ 161(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A), for imminent threat exception to notice requirement 
and consent decrees, respectively.  
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statutes. Without a publicly available definition of “imminence”, 
however, it can be difficult for courts to understand and review Executive 
Branch interpretations of such a constraint.429 
Courts have sometimes adopted similar language that reflects a degree 
of urgency similar to that intended by the acute and chronic distinction. 
The D.C. Circuit has noted that “whatever special powers the Executive 
may hold in national security situations must be limited to instances of 
immediate and grave peril to the nation.”430 The Second Circuit has noted 
that “[e]xercising the power has always been statutorily limited to 
‘particular circumstances such as “time of war or when war is imminent,” 
the needs of “public safety” or of “national security or defense,” or 
“urgent and impending need.”’”431 Although this limitation is usually 
applied to agencies in the Executive branch rather than the President 
himself, at least one court has interpreted a statutory imminency 
limitation with regards to presidential action.432 
Secrecy makes the entire project of constraints more complex. As 
many scholars have noted, the President’s ability to claim executive 
privilege for information related to national security can complicate any 
efforts at meaningful judicial review.433 If the President is not required to 
disclose the basis for her national security decisions, there is little hope 
for meaningful judicial review. Without a more transparent process, the 
public is left with little more than executive self-assurances that they are 
following the law. it is hard to see whether the Executive is even 
following the law, beyond their own assurances that they are.  
                                                                                                                     
 429. See Sudha Setty, The President’s Private Dictionary: How Secret Definitions 
Undermine Domestic and Transnational Efforts at Executive Branch Accountability, 24 IND. J 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513, 532 (2017) (discussing the uncertainty of how the Obama 
administration interpreted “imminence” when authorizing drone strikes). 
 430. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 431. Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 670 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 598 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 432. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899–901 (D.D.C. 1982) (providing, in dicta, 
an interpretation of a federal statute’s presidential reporting requirement when the President 
determines American soldiers face “imminent” hostility, although finding issue regarding 
presidential action as a non-justiciable political question); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. 
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1109–14 (D. Minn. 1982) (relying upon legislative history of federal 
environmental statutes to determine the meaning of “imminent and substantial endangerment” in 
upholding presidential action). 
 433. See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During 
the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 403–04 (2002); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated 
Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491 (2007); Robert M. Chesney, 
State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); 
David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010). See generally SUDHA SETTY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2017). 
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In short, Congress should more closely evaluate its delegations of 
national security power to the President, considering whether the same 
effect can be achieved with the imposition of procedural constraints. 
They may consider better defining “national security” and demand 
heightened procedural hurdles where a national security threat is chronic 
as opposed to acute. Similarly, courts should continue to recognize these 
statutory limits on the President and not automatically switch to extreme 
deference mode at the mere mention of national security.  
CONCLUSION 
It is extremely difficult to strike the right balance between the 
branches in regard to national security. In addition to deference, political 
constraints, and constitutional constraints, all of which receive significant 
scholarly attention, this Article fights to give procedural constraints a seat 
at the scholarly table. It does so by acknowledging their limitations, but 
also by demonstrating their current and future viability for enhancing 
accountability and transparency in the President’s use of statutory 
national security powers. It addresses concerns about binding a 
president’s hands with bureaucratic procedures by tailoring the 
constraints according to whether the national security threats are chronic 
or acute. Although these constraints are not perfect, they are worthy of 
consideration in an effort to reach a more balanced exercise of statutory 
national security power. Without congressional constraints on a 
president’s exercise of these statutory national security powers, courts 
may be left to flounder. A lack of internal constraints runs the risk of 
conflating the treatment of constitutional and statutory authority and 
failing to realize the separation of powers. As Justice Jackson has 
remarked, “[w]e may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs 
in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from 
slipping through its fingers.”434 Justice Jackson noted that the examples 
of foreign experience with emergency powers suggests that “emergency 
powers are consistent with free government only when their control is 
lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them.”435 
  
                                                                                                                     
 434. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 435. Id. at 652. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Year 
Executive Orders in the 
Name of National Security 
or with Consideration of 
National Security 
 
Authority Cited 
2018 Exec. Order No. 13,823, 83 
Fed. Reg. 4831 (Protecting 
America Through Lawful 
Detention of Terrorists) 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,840, 83 
Fed. Reg. 29,431 (Ocean 
Policy to Advance the 
Economic, Security, and 
Environmental Interests of 
the United States) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
2017 Exec. Order No. 13,757, 82 
Fed. Reg. 1 (Malicious Cyber 
Activities) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) 
(NEA), and section 301 
of title 3, United States 
Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8793 (Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101 et seq.) (INA), the 
Secure Fence Act of 
2006 (Public Law 109-
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367) (Secure Fence Act), 
and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (Public Law 
104-208 Div. C) 
(IIRIRA) 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Public 
Safety in the Interior) 
 
 
By the authority vested in 
me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) (8 
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8977 (Foreign 
Terrorist Entry) 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of 
the United States of 
America, including the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,773, 82 
Fed. Reg. 10,691 (Preventing 
International Trafficking)  
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 
Fed. Reg.13,209 (Second 
Foreign Terrorist Entry) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of 
the United States of 
America, including the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
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 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 
Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Promoting 
Energy Independence”) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 
Fed. Reg. 18,837 (Buy 
American and Hire 
American)  
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, and to ensure 
the faithful execution of 
the laws 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 
Fed. Reg. 20,815 (America-
First Offshore Energy 
Strategy) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 
1331 et seq.,  
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,800, 82 
Fed. Reg. 22,391 
(Strengthening 
Cybersecurity)  
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,803, 82 
Fed. Reg. 31,429 (National 
Space Council) 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order. No. 13,810, 82 
Fed. Reg. 44,705 (Imposing 
Additional Sanctions With 
Respect to North Korea) 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
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(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the 
United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945 
(22 U.S.C. 287c) 
(UNPA), section 1 of 
title II of Public Law 65-
24, ch. 30, June 15, 
1917, as amended (50 
U.S.C. 191), sections 
212(f) and 215(a) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 
1185(a)), and section 301 
of title 3, United States 
Code; and in view of 
United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 2321 of 
November 30, 2016, 
UNSCR 2356 of June 2, 
2017, UNSCR 2371 of 
August 5, 2017, and 
UNSCR 2375 of 
September 11, 2017 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 
Fed. Reg. 60835, (Ensure 
Secure and Reliable Supplies 
of Critical Minerals) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 
Fed. Reg. 60,839 (Blocking 
the Property of Persons 
Involved in Human Rights 
Abuse or Corruption) 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
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U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) 
(NEA), the Global 
Magnitsky Human 
Rights Accountability 
Act (Public Law 114-
328) (the “Act”), section 
212(f) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) 
(INA), and section 301 
of title 3, United States 
Code 
2016 Exec. Order No. 13,717, 81 
Fed. Reg. 6407 (Earthquake 
Risk Management Standard) 
 
 
 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
Earthquake Hazards 
Reduction Act of 1977, 
as amended, and section 
121(a) of title 40, United 
States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,718, 81 
Fed. Reg. 7441 (Enhancing 
National Cybersecurity) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,721, 81 
Fed. Reg. 14,685 
(Counterterrorism)  
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including 
section 2656 of title 22, 
United States Code, and 
section 3161 of title 5, 
United States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,726, 81 
Fed. Reg. 23,559 (Suspending 
Entry to Persons Contributing 
to Situation in Lybia) 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
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 America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), 
section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,729, 81 
Fed. Reg. 32,611 (Mass 
Atrocity Prevention and 
Response) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,732, 81 
Fed. Reg. 44,485 (Civilian 
Casualties in U.S. Operations) 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,741, 81 
Fed. Reg. 68,289 (Role of 
National Background 
Investigations Bureau) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
2015 Exec. Order 13,687, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 819 (Sanctions on North 
Korea) 
 
 
 
 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), 
section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and 
80
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Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 
Fed. Reg. 4191 (National 
Efforts in the Arctic) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,690, 80 
Fed. Reg. 6425 (Flood Risk 
Management Standard) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,691 
(Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,694 
(Blocking Property of Persons 
Engaged in Malicious Cyber-
Enabled Activities) 
 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), 
section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,698 
(Hostage Recovery 
Activities) 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
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 of the United States of 
America 
 
 Exec. Order No. 13,712 
(Blocking Property of 
Persons Contributing to 
Burundi Situation) 
By the authority vested 
in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of 
America, including the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National 
Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), 
section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 
(8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and 
section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code 
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